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Abstract  
The poverty trap hypothesis postulates that very low income individuals may be trapped in 
poverty because severe constraints give rise to behaviour that limits their ability to take up and 
benefit from new investments. Furthermore, the theory suggests that insurance and credit can 
serve as effective tools in counteracting the mechanisms that create this type of persistent 
poverty. In this study, using data obtained from two separate samples of farmers in the Western 
Cape, we explore the validity of this hypothesis in a South African context. One sample consists 
of organic farmers from Cape Town whilst the other comprises of conventional farmers from 
the Matzikama Municipality. We elicit behavioural traits; more specifically risk preferences, 
using lottery type experiments with real money at stake. Using a series of logit regressions we 
look at the relationship between these preferences i.e. risk aversion, loss aversion and nonlinear 
probability weighting and actual uptake of farm technology in both samples. Using the 
Matzikama sample, we then apply the estimates to uptake in an experimental setting where 
insurance and credit are provided. The experimental study allows us to test for both absolute 
and path dependent effects by examining both the levels, using a multinomial logit model, and 
the timing, using a cox proportional hazard model, of uptake. The results from the real life data 
show that the effects of the risk preferences tend to differ depending on the type of technology, 
and this is true for both samples. One consistent finding from both the real life and experimental 
uptake data is that the farmers who live in households that have below average relative income 
levels are less likely to take up technology; even with insurance and loans being made available 
in the experiment. This finding is unexpected given that all the farmers face the same objective 
risk levels and do not have their real life income at stake in the experiment. Our results show 
that the availability of insurance improves uptake in the overall sample and can serve as 
effective tools in reducing poverty. However, contrary to the poverty trap hypotheses, little 
evidence is found to suggest that the insurance contract in the study sufficiently serves as a 
device to counteract the risk preferences that are linked to low technology uptake. This finding 
is evident when considering both absolute uptake and the timing of uptake. Therefore, the 
results on the effects of insurance and credit on technology uptake, given risk preference and 
relative income position, may imply that low income farmers in South Africa are not only 
constrained by behaviour that is prompted by monetary or risk factors but also other 
behavioural or psychological components e.g. the feeling of hopelessness that stems from 
persisting conditions of poverty; however, this requires further investigation. 
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Introduction 
There is a growing urgency in the need to intensify food production. The world’s 
population is projected to increase to approximately 9 billion people by 2050 (UNPD, 2006) 
and even the most optimistic projections of future food demand call for growth in food 
production by nearly 50 percent (Ray et al., 2013).  In developing countries, small scale farming 
is currently being seen as a means to meet these food production targets and also as a device 
for achieving significant reduction in poverty. Small-scale farmers are one of the most 
underprivileged and vulnerable people in developing countries. In addition, most of the people 
existing in absolute poverty in these countries live on small farms.  Growth analyses have 
revealed that, for developing countries, the agricultural sector has to a certain degree a strong 
positive effect on growth in non-agricultural sectors and a comparatively bigger impact on 
poverty than its evident portion of the economy (Timmer, 2002; World Bank, 2001; Nagayets, 
2005; Bezemer, 2008).  Hence, the growth of small-scale farming amongst low income groups 
can be a viable solution to the development, food security and poverty challenge in developing 
countries.   
A number of key features of agricultural led growth since the green revolution of the 
1960’s have been identified in the literature (Hazel and Diao, 2005).  In this paper, we focus 
on one of these key features, namely technological innovation. Agricultural growth needs to be 
technologically driven so that output prices can fall while farm incomes increase (Hazel and 
Diao, 2005). That is to say that wide-ranging diffusion of new and innovative technology is a 
precondition for growth in small-scale agriculture. Diffusion itself is an outcome of a sequence 
of individual decisions to initiate the use of new technology. These decisions are based on 
comparisons of the uncertain costs and benefits of adopting new inventions (Uaiene, 2009). 
Since technological diffusion is a crucial means of development for poor countries, a poor or 
slow-growing economy would indicate incomplete technology uptake or the underutilization 
of inputs that are linked to technology (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010). An examination of the 
factors that influence technology uptake choices is thus necessary for policy makers in 
developing countries to make effective contributions to food security, economic growth and 
poverty reduction.  
There is evidence to suggest that incomplete technology uptake can be linked to the 
inability of the poor to enjoy the benefits of growth. This occurs because the ability to benefit 
from growth is linked to the countries initial conditions e.g. initial levels of income inequality 
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(Ravallion, 2001). Growth in agriculture necessitates a broad based and equitable mechanism 
in order for it to be economically efficient and by which purchasing power can be increased 
amongst the rural masses; as opposed to a privileged few.  This mechanism would require 
equitable access to land, modern farm inputs, credit, and markets in the economy (Hazel and 
Diao, 2005).  If we consider a polarised country such as South Africa, looking at technological 
growth alone while ignoring equity issues may hide a great deal of structural immobility or 
hopelessness which can be masked by the increased success of farmers that already own assets 
and benefit from returns (Carter and Berrett, 2006). 
 There are a number of theoretical hypotheses that suggest that South Africa suffers 
from a legacy of blocked pathways and structural immobility, thus leaving a large numbers of 
people in a poverty trap (Adato et al., 2006). In the country, equity lines are more pronounced 
because rising income gaps bear a distinctive racial footprint (Leibbrandt et al., 2011). Poor 
small-holder farmers in developing countries such as South Africa,  where income inequalities 
are high, usually have no or limited access to land, modern farm inputs, credit, and markets. 
These constraints on access to or ownership of assets may account for the slow diffusion of 
agricultural technology and low agricultural growth in South African smallholder farming. 
Even though the post-apartheid South African government has delivered considerable pro poor 
support through broad social grants and capital structures, it is evident that further efforts need 
to be carried out to lessen the growing intra race inequality and reduce the constraints that poor 
farmers face (Finn et al., 2014). 
 If we consider a more basic poverty trap process, poor South African farmers will be 
caught in a poverty trap when they have limited access to financial services such as credit and 
insurance and marginal returns to investment increase with increase in wealth. This 
circumstance gives rise to a situation where low income farmers have limited assets and are 
also unable accumulate assets, e.g. farm technology, in order to advance themselves. This is 
because, in condition like these, distribution of incomes will be a divergent process. Groups or 
individuals that are poor at the outset will be trapped in poverty, whereas those that are initially 
more affluent can progress to higher levels of wealth (Barrett and Carter, 2013; Adato et al., 
2006). Given the unchangeable features of the poor and the conditions of production and 
exchange technologies, a poor equilibrium outcome is the only situation that exists for initially 
poor farmers (Barrett and Carter, 2013). Nonetheless, when the poor can secure loans based on 
future incomes; with the aim of taking on investments, or acquire insurance; in order mitigate 
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the effects of future losses,  a convergence in the distribution of incomes possible i.e. the wealth 
levels of the initially poor farmers can grow towards that of their wealthier counterparts (Adato 
et al., 2006).  
There are numerous processes that cause poverty traps to exist and this paper we 
identify four; from current literature, which appear to be relevant to the South African case. 
These are: Inadequate asset poverty traps: This is based solely on initial asset holdings and 
increasing marginal returns to investment as wealth rises; Dynamic and inter-generational 
poverty traps: These poverty traps are grounded in the household characteristics that are 
correlated with poverty, e.g. residing in unsafe or decrepit housing locations or the absence of 
capable male role models in a household. These are factors that can create a sub-culture of 
poverty, pervade family values or entrap the current and future generation of the household in 
the same detrimental behaviour or system of living. Social and economic exclusion poverty 
traps: These traps are a result of prejudices that are linked to features such as caste and race. 
Spatial development traps: These types of poverty traps are location dependent and occur 
when a disproportionately high population of poor people are situated in locations that place 
them at a productive disadvantage or high risk, as in the case of the urban informal settlements 
in and around Cape Town and other major South Africa cities. The disadvantage can be 
associated with factors such as great levels of community-based vulnerability e.g. long distance 
to markets, lack of arable land, droughts or floods. (Duclos and O’Connell, 2009; Thorbecke, 
2013).   
Poor households can face a number of these poverty traps concurrently (Thorbecke, 
2013).  When a combination of poverty trap processes are working together simultaneously, a 
multiple equilibria poverty trap can exist. Multiple equilibrium poverty traps have numerous 
stable states, with no less than one equilibrium linked to a state of poverty. At the boundaries 
between these multiple stable states, multiple equilibrium suggests the presence of a critical 
threshold i.e. ‘an unstable dynamic equilibrium’. Above this threshold, the system is 
characterized by a building up of assets while below this threshold a diminishing of assets 
dominates. The existence of this threshold, due to multiple equilibrium, complicates risk 
management because, in this instance, shocks can only exogenously shift the underlying forces 
of asset accumulation in the presence of multiple equilibria (Barnet et al., 2008; Barret and 
Carter, 2013). Therefore, the collective consequence of mutually reinforcing poverty traps is 
to heighten the scale of poverty (Mwabu and Thorbecke, 2004; Thorbecke, 2013). 
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Poverty traps may further be deepened by behavioural anomalies that occur in 
conditions of multiple equilibrium. Crucial material determinants of persevering poverty, e.g. 
low asset holdings, can lead to endogenous changes in risk preferences in such a way that 
results in behaviour based path dependent poverty. In addition, amongst individuals facing 
multiple equilibrium poverty traps, observed behaviour is driven not only by fixed risk 
preferences but also ex ante risk management practice that are determined by expected future 
asset levels (Lybbert and Barrett, 2011; Barret and Carter, 2013). Ex ante actions to decrease 
vulnerability to risk can inhibit accumulation of assets and in so doing produce a low-level 
equilibrium. Also, the ex post results of a shock can cause a relapse into poverty trap. However, 
the deterrent effects of risk can be limited if financial market failures are addressed such that 
financial institutions are available and can enable poor individuals to adopt insurance, ex ante, 
in order to mitigate shocks, or acquire loans which can serve as quasi-insurance due to the ex 
post nature of loan repayments (Carter and Barrett, 2006; Barnett et al., 2008)  
If we consider the farming scenario, there are two reasons farmers will be motivated to 
obtain insurance. First, farmers have usually been found to be risk averse which indicates that 
the costs of occasionally large losses are considered to be more severe by farmers than the cost 
of relatively minor annual insurance premiums. Second, insurance can enable loan uptake since 
it can serve as a qualification for taking on credit by shielding creditors from the consequences 
of farmers’ misfortunes (Patt et al., 2010). Therefore, government support of greater access and 
availability of loans can be useful to agricultural modernization policy, especially if insurance, 
which serves as risk-transfer device, is made available (Mahul and Stutley, 2010).  
A number of countries have supported agricultural insurance schemes.  For example, 
India and Mexico have developed extensive and massive weather based crop insurance 
schemes to safeguard farmers against harsh weather variation. China saw a substantial growth 
in the agriculture insurance market through government backing and premium subsidies. In 
2008, its market became the world’s second largest; surpassed only by the United States. 
China’s subsidies on agricultural insurance premiums have been successful in boosting their 
agricultural insurance markets. Nonetheless, these subsidies need careful consideration since 
they can alter price signals and offer inappropriate incentives that lead to the finance of 
unreasonable farm activities or induce a certain degree of moral hazard (Mahul and Stutley, 
2010).  Subsidised insurance premiums are often required when cost on premiums are so high 
that low income farmers cannot afford them.  Costs of premiums tend to be high when they are 
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accompanied by high administrative cost, as a result, the creditors’ burden of assessing losses 
at each farm level. A significant reduction of administrative costs can be achieved by tying 
insurance to a simple and broad indicator of losses such poor rainfall.  Pay-outs from such 
insurance contracts, instead of being linked to real substantiated losses, will be linked to  broad 
occurrences or events that creates losses. However even though this type of insurance scheme 
is more economical to administer, it has a shortcoming in that it cannot completely cover risk. 
Farmers may still face basis risk i.e. the possibility of a failed harvest that is not reflected in 
the indicators of loss used by the creditors (Patt et al., 2010). 
Another financial market imperfection that can influence poverty traps, such as in the 
case of ineffective insurance markets, is the cognitive or practical limitation of predicting or 
measuring outcomes. A good quantification of outcomes is a precondition for evaluating to 
what degree agents will be receptive to variation in earnings that are linked to the use of inputs 
or technologies. However, these sorts of measurements are often not straightforward (Foster 
and Rosenzweig, 2010). The extent to which agricultural producers have cognitive 
shortcomings in measuring outcomes such as gains and losses or costs of insurance and loans 
will have behavioural consequences on risk management decisions, including the actual 
demand for the agricultural technology or insurance (Mahul and Stutley, 2010).  For example,  
studies have found that majority of people tend to poorly evaluate the probability of a loss 
which hinders their capability to assess whether or not a certain insurance contract is fair 
(Johnson et al., 1993 in Patt et al., 2010). Unfortunately, many studies that have looked at 
behavioural anomalies and their influences on farm risk management decisions have failed to 
consider cognitive failures in processing probability.  One reason is that earlier behavioural 
economic studies have generally assumed that individual behaviour is consistent with expected 
utility. 
 Expected utility assumes a linear processing of probabilities and that farmers will, 
given their level of risk aversion, select the technology that offers the maximum expected utility 
(Feder et al., 1985; Sunding and Zilberman, 2001; Isik and Khanna, 2003; Marra et al., 2003; 
Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010, Barham et al. 2014).  However, more recent research identify 
several systematic violations of the expected utility model (Starmer, 2000, Hershey and 
Schoemaker 1985; Bleichrodt et al. 2001; Abdellaoui et al. 2007; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981). 
One theory namely, prospect theory, delivers empirical proof from numerous sets of choice 
problems where preferences fail to conform to expect utility theory axioms (Kahneman and 
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Tversky, 1979; Sebora and Cornwall, 1995).  The theory suggests three consistent violations 
of expected utility which occur in a two-staged process. The first and second violations occur 
in the first stage.  The first violation is reference dependence which is that agents view choices 
as changes to their current wealth relative to a subjective reference point. From this reference 
point, agents have a tendency to be risk averse towards changes perceived as gains and risk 
seeking towards changes perceived as losses (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981; Sebora and 
Cornwall, 1995), with individuals being more sensitive to losses compared to gains; this is the 
second violation, which is often referred to as loss aversion. It is in fact expected that farmers 
will have a subjective reference points for evaluating outcomes e.g. subsistence incomes in the 
context of farm production decisions. The second stage; and third violation, is the nonlinear 
weighting of probabilities. A growing number of empirical evidence exists to support the 
notion that farmers depend on subjective probabilities as opposed to real or objective 
probabilities (Bocqueho et al., 2013). 
In this study, we explore how these behavioural anomalies (i.e. risk aversion, loss 
aversion and nonlinear probability weighting) and proxies for asset holdings (relative 
household income position and household monthly income) are linked with decisions to invest 
in farm technology. We, therefore, determine whether or not these factors are determinants of 
poverty traps by way of their effects on investment carried out by smallholder farmers. Since 
we do not have data on asset holdings of the farmers, we adopt a rudimentary approach by 
assuming relative income as a proxy for asset holdings. Individuals with below average relative 
household income are considered to be the poor farmers. We do not explicitly explore for the 
present of a threshold but if there is a significant enough divergence at the threshold, as in the 
case of multiple equilibria poverty traps, we will see a substantial difference between the 
poorest and the richest group. We estimate the parameters of behavioural traits under the 
assumption of prospect theory. 
The analysis is conduct using data from two samples of small scale farmers, one 
comprising of organic farmers in Cape Town and the other of conventional farmers from the 
Matsikama Municipality of Western Cape, South Africa. In chapter one, we consider the 
conventional farming context while in chapter two we look at the organic farmers. Since 
organic farming defers from conventional farming, by its dependence on natural ecological 
systems alone, it may present with different risks and risk management methods. (Hanson et 
al., 2004). In chapter 3, we explore the uptake of technology in an experimental setting. In the 
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experimental setting, we test for the effects of loan and insurance availability on technology 
uptake.  Decisions are carried out in a series of time frames, thus we are able to consider the 
time dependent dynamics of uptake. 
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Chapter 1 - Risk Preferences and Poverty Traps: A Look at Technology Uptake 
amongst Smallholder Farmers in the Matzikama Municipality. 
1.1 Introduction 
Behavioural economic studies on farmers’ decision to take up technology have 
commonly recognized an aversion risk as, inter alia, being crucial to farm technology adoption 
decisions. More recent studies are beginning to realise the role of loss aversion, which is 
sensitivity to losses relative to gains, and the way in which individuals assess probabilities in 
technology uptake decisions. In this chapter, we study the effects of risk and loss aversion and 
probability weighting on technology uptake, using a sample of small-scale farmers in the 
Western Cape Province of South Africa. In addition, and owing to the poverty trap hypothesis, 
we consider the role of relative income constraints on technology uptake and how that leads to 
poverty traps for small-scale farmers.  
Numerous studies have found that the diffusion of new farm technology has been slow 
in developing countries (Feder et al., 1985; Engle-Warnick et al., 2007; Duflo et al., 2011; 
Simtowe, 2006, Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 2002; Brick and Visser, 2014). This is occurring 
despite the benefits of recent modern innovations in technology. For example, there now exists 
an extensive range of genetically modified crops that boast being more nutrient-rich while at 
the same time having more insect, disease and drought resistance than traditional varieties (Liu 
and Huang, 2010). The slow diffusion rates have been attributed to a number of limitations that 
farmers in developing countries face, some of which are economic situations, poor access to 
social capital, credit and insurance markets. These limitations place important restrictions on 
households’ ability to prepare for and respond to shocks. Besides the effects of these constraints 
on the physical ability to take up technology, they have also been found to prompt risk and loss 
averse behaviour toward new farm technology. These fears of risk and loss have been suspected 
(and in some cases proven) to contribute to the poverty trap in which farmers in developing 
countries find themselves (Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2009 and Liu, 2013). In South Africa the 
incidence of these constraints is uniquely polarised, a consequence of racially entrenched 
poverty and inequality, raising questions about the capacity of the poor to use social 
instruments to construct passages out of  poverty (Adato et al.; 2006).   
A standard feature of poverty trap models is that they recognize a critical asset threshold 
about where there is a divergence of behaviour.  Pathways out of persistent poverty are 
obstructed beneath this threshold, whereas above this threshold there are opportunities to 
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advance productively and accumulate assets (Carter and Barrett, 2006; 2007).  The presence of 
this threshold hinges on the degree to which households are restricted in intertemporal 
exchange by the use of formal and informal credit, insurance or savings (Carter and Barret, 
2006).  Hence, there is a need for studies on the behavior of poor farmers in South Africa, 
which is a society characterized by polarized income and asset levels, to consider this 
physically limiting threshold as a potentially critical factor that interacts with fear of risk and 
loss in the technology diffusion process.  
Risk aversion describes the observed behaviour that individuals are reluctant to accept 
a situation when there is a variance in outcome. Loss aversion in turn describes the observed 
behaviour that individuals are more sensitive to losses relative to commensurate gains 
(Köbberling and Wakker, 2005). This implies that individuals are more concerned with the 
downside risk of investment, as opposed to upside risk.  Numerous studies have been carried 
out on the role of risk aversion on farm technology uptake whereas the influence of loss 
aversion is not often explored.  Another under-represented factor that may potentially play a 
key role in determining whether or not technology is taken up is the cognitive processing of 
probabilities. Evidence has shown that individuals do not always accurately process 
probabilities; they have a tendency to overweight the probability of unlikely events and 
underweight the probability of likely events. By way of example, let’s consider a natural-hazard 
such as a flood: the perceived probability is linked to an individual’s expectation of being 
affected by a flood and its severity (Grothman and Patt, 2005). An underweighting of the 
probability of a flood or its severity will result in a lower likelihood of using technology such 
as a buffer to mitigate the impact of a flood. 
 We, therefore, consider probability weighting, along with risk and loss aversion, to be 
psychological factors that determine farm technology uptake.  These factors are regarded in 
behavioral economics as risk preferences. We use the prospect theory method in Tanaka et al. 
(2010) (TCN) to measure the three parameters, i.e. risk aversion, loss aversion, and nonlinear 
weighting of probabilities, under the assumption of prospect theory. TCN, under the 
assumption cumulative prospect theory, conducted experiments with villagers in North and 
South Vietnam. They presented three different multiple price lists with paired lottery choices. 
The experiment was framed in such a way that the switching point in each list could be used to 
evaluate the three prospect theory parameters based on a ‘parsimonious three parameter 
cumulative prospect value function’ (Hurley, 2010).   They find that, on average, individuals 
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were risk averse and overweighed small probabilities whilst underweighting high probabilities. 
They find a high degree of loss aversion with approximately 90 percent of their sample 
exhibiting loss aversion.    
Not enough literature has looked at loss aversion and nonlinear probability weighting 
when considering farmer characteristics. We, however, provide a minor account of what some 
research has delivered so far.  In contrast, a substantial amount of literature on risk aversion 
has been carried out. Previous empirical and experimental evidence suggests that most 
individuals are risk averse. Binswanger (1980) conducted gains frame lottery type experiments 
using a constant partial risk aversion utility function. The study finds that most individuals are 
risk averse with high payoffs being linked to intermediate and moderate levels of risk aversion. 
Barr (2003) conducted a similar experiment in Zimbabwe but included opportunities for 
individuals to pool risk.  The study shows that most of the sample is risk averse with risk 
aversion decreasing when individuals could pool risk by being part of a group.  
  Miyata (2003), Wike et al. (2004), Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009) also use a method 
similar to Binswanger. Miyata (2003) in examining risk attitudes of individuals in village 
households in Indonesia finds three quarters of the sample to be in the range of severely to 
moderately risk averse.  Miyata’s ordered probit regressions shows that the more educated or 
wealthy an individual is the less he/she exhibits risk aversion. People who live in household 
with larger household sizes are also found to be less risk averse.  Wik et al. (2004) in 
experiments with Zambian villagers find a relationship between lottery payoffs and risk 
aversion. Their results show that risk aversion ranges from severe risk aversion to risk 
neutrality when relatively low payoffs are involved but with high payoffs, severe risk aversion 
to moderate risk aversion is observed. They find women to be more risk averse than men and 
risk aversion to be increasing with land size. According to their results, household size, income 
and education are all negatively correlated with risk aversion. Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009), 
using a gains frame lottery, find risk to be the dominant behaviour pattern – with more than 79 
percent of their sample displaying risk aversion irrespective of payoffs. Nonetheless, unlike 
Binswager, Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009) also consider lotteries presented in a combination of 
both gain and loss prospects. Risk aversion still dominates with 66 percent of the sample 
exhibiting risk aversion which is robust to payoff changes. They find that wealth and farm size 
are negatively correlated with risk aversion, while age of household head and percentage of 
children in the household are positively correlated with risk aversion.  
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The effects of individual and household characteristics on risk aversion are contentious 
due to the inconsistency of results found in various studies. The studies we have presented so 
far suggest that being male, higher incomes and greater wealth are all negatively related to risk 
aversion, but this may not always be the case. Mosley and Verschoor (2005), in looking at risk 
attitudes of semi-subsistence farmers, use an experiment that consists of seven different lottery 
pairs with only one choice being played for money. They find no evidence to suggest that 
gender, income and wealth are consistent determinants of risk aversion.  
Using a mixture model approach, Harrison et al. (2010) assume both expected utility 
and prospect theory. However, because all their lottery type experiments are gain framed, their 
prospect theory model does not account for loss aversion. They find that most of the individuals 
in their sample are risk averse under the expected utility assumption, with women and age 
being linked to less risk aversion. Using prospect theory, they also find similar results. Most of 
the individuals in the sample are found to underweight low probability events and overweight 
high probability events with the effect being more prominent the greater the household size.  
Half their samples are seen to behave in terms of prospect theory while just under half the 
sample conforms to expected utility. Their study is unique in that it separates individuals by 
those who conform to expected utility and those that behave in terms of prospect theory, 
whereas most studies have estimated parameters by either only assuming expected utility or 
prospect theory. Ward and Singh (2013) in a series of field experiments conducted in rural 
India find that women are more risk and loss averse than men, although, as they explain, this 
may be caused by a higher proportion of risk averse women in the sample. 
In the context of technology adoption, fewer studies have considered risk preferences 
in the prospect theory context. Amongst the studies that assume this theory, Hill (2005) finds, 
using a sample of Ugandan farmers, that risk aversion is correlated with replanting of coffee 
trees. Ward and Singh (2013) find that loss aversion is more correlated with a switch from 
traditional rice seeds to the new variety they explored. Liu (2013) using the methodology of 
TCN and a Weibull hazard model finds that risk aversion and loss aversion amongst farmers 
in China is correlated with later adoption of Bt cotton, while farmers who overweight  small 
probabilities are found to adopt Bt cotton earlier.  
 Besides the prospect theory parameters, numerous studies have recognised certain 
important drivers of uptake. Nhemachena and Hassan (2007) and Deressa et al. (2009) find 
household size to be positively related to farm technology uptake. This may be because larger 
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household size assists in the realisation of numerous agricultural practices since households 
with more members will not have the labour constraint that households with fewer members 
suffer (Croppenstedt et al., 2003; Nhemachena and Hassan, 2007). Nhemachena and Hassan 
(2007) and Deressa et al. (2009) also find that female headed households were more likely to 
adopt a farm strategy or technology.  Panda et al. (2013) find that total income and total farming 
income are linked to a change of crop variety. Their results show that farm experience, land 
area irrigated, and access to credit to be correlated with two of the uptake options they explored. 
Shiferaw and Holden’s (1998) findings suggest that age and adoption of soil conservation 
techniques are negatively correlated, implying that older farmers are more reluctant to modify 
farm practices.  
Conceivably, one other important factor in the decision to take up technology is 
expectations related to climate and weather events or conditions. As climate changes worsen, 
causing occurrences like droughts and floods, short-run fluctuations in food production in semi-
arid will become more pronounced (Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007). In order to mitigate the 
effects of adverse climate on agricultural efficiency, farmers are likely to adopt agricultural 
practices that make them more immune to the risk of ‘bad weather’ (Belliveau et al., 2006). 
For the purpose of this analysis, we consider 7 farm technologies and practices, namely 
drought resistant crops, improved seeds, intercropping, fertilizer, organic manure, wind breaks 
and irrigation.  We use experimental and survey data obtained from 125 farmers from farming 
communities in the Matzikama Municipality of Western Cape, South Africa. The study looks 
at the determinants of farm technology uptake – paying special attention to farmers’ risk 
preferences and relative income position (which acts as a proxy for accumulated assets).  
The paper is broken down into the following: Section 1.1 presents an introduction and 
review of current literature. Section 1.2 shows the summary statistics of the farmers’ 
characteristics. Section 1.3 describes the experiment design and methodology for eliciting the 
prospect theory parameters. Section 1.4 explains the results for the determinants of risk 
aversion, loss aversion and non-linear probability weighting. Section 1.5 presents the results of 
the logit regressions on technology uptake decisions. Sections 1.6 provides a conclusion along 
with policy recommendations. 
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1.2 Background and Summary Statistics  
The data used in this analysis was obtained by Martine Visser, Kerri Brick and Feri 
Gwata of the Environmental Research Policy Unit EPRU, University of Cape Town, via survey 
collection and risk experiments carried out with small-scale farmers in the Matzikama 
Municipality of the Western Cape, South Africa, between July and August of 20101. 
Agriculture in Matzikama is supported by the Clanwilliam Dam and Olifants River. The area 
which is mostly dominated by viniculture, vegetables, citrus fruits and livestock production is 
characterised by arid terrains and cool temperatures (Matzikama IDP, 2009-2010).  
The sample consists of 125 farmers from the towns of Vanrhynsdorp, Lutzville, Klawer, 
Clanwilliam and Wupperthal who were recruited through the Matzikama Emerging Farmers 
Forum. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of farmer characteristics. Average approximate 
age of farmers in the sample is about 43 yrs., with approximately 44 percent of the farmers 
being female and 55.6 percent being male. Average monthly household income is R2365 with 
about 60 percent of the sample being below the average relative household income level.  Only 
30 percent of the farmers have an alternative source of employment outside of farming. The 
respondents were asked yes or no questions about their own belief about their behaviour in the 
context of risk. When asked about how frequently they take risks, 20 percent of the respondents 
indicated that they “often” take risks, 54 percent said they ‘“sometimes” take risks and 26 
percent indicated that they “never” take risks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 See Appendix 1 for sampe quetionnare.  
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The farmers were also asked whether or not they noticed any changes in Rainfall 
(frequency and timing), Rainfall (Level and intensity), temperature and pests. The summary 
statistics are presented in Table 2. Altogether, 62 percent of the respondents stated that they 
noticed changes in the state of rainfall frequency and timing, 70 percent stated that they had 
noticed a change in rainfall level and intensity and 59 percent stated that they had perceived 
temperature changes. Since climate is essentially a local phenomenon (IPCC, 2001) it is 
difficult to say how these perceived changes will affect technology uptake in this context.   
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Table 2: Climate change perceptions 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Rainfall (Frequency and Timing) 62% 49% 
Rainfall(Level and Intensity) 70% 46% 
Temperature Changes 59% 49% 
Changes in Pest Levels 64% 48% 
Sample Size:125     
 
In the survey, respondents were asked to indicate whether they had started using any 
new farming practices. The summary statistics for these farming practices are presented in 
Table 3. Just less than 9 percent said they use more drought resistant crops (i.e. crops that are 
more resilient to poor rainfall), 8.8 percent use improved seeds (i.e. seeds of the hybrid 
pollinated variety), 12.4 percent use intercropping, 9.6 percent use fertilizer, 20.8 percent use 
organic manure, wind breaks usage is at 10.4 percent and irrigation use is at 19.2 percent .  
 
Table 3: Farm Uptake  
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
   
Drought Resistant Crops 8.80% 28.40% 
Improved Seeds 8.80% 28.40% 
Intercropping 14.40% 35.30% 
Fertilizer 9.60% 29.60% 
Organic Manure 20.80% 40.80% 
Wind Breaks 10.40% 30.60% 
Irrigation 19.20% 39.50% 
Sample Size:125     
 
1.3 Risk Preference Elicitation and Estimation 
1.3.1 Methodology 
The experiments in this study were modelled after the design of Tanaka, Camerer and 
Nguyen (2010) (TCN) who assume cumulative prospect theory. TCN use a series of gain-
only and gain-and-loss pair-wise lotteries with both a risky and safe option (similar to Holt 
and Laury (2002)). They assumed the following utility function:  
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 ( ,  ;  ,  ) =   
 ( ) +  ( )  ( ) −  ( )              >   > 0;   <   < 0 
 ( ) ( ) +  ( ) ( )                                           < 0 <   
          Equation 1.1   
  U(x, p; y, q) denotes the expected value linked to prospects(x, p; y, q),  p and q are the 
probabilities of receiving outcomes x and y, respectively. The power function v(x) = x   for 
gains (x > 0) and v(x) = −λ(−x ) for losses (x < 0) is assumed with σ  being the risk 
aversion parameter (i.e. measure of the concavity of the value function) and λ the parameter 
for loss aversion. The risk aversion parameter (σ) is presumed to be identical in both gains and 
losses; the inequality σ > 1  implies risk seeking preferences and σ <1 implies risk averse 
behaviour. For λ, λ>1(λ<1) implies greater sensitive to losses (gains) compared to gains 
(losses).  
 TCN use the nonlinear probability weighting function of Prelec (1998) where π(p) =
exp[−(− ln p) ] with the function being linear if   α = 1. If α = 1 and λ = 1; in this case the 
model reduces to expected utility.  If α < 1  the function is an inverted S-shape. The inverted 
S-shape indicates that small probabilities are overweighed and large probabilities are 
underweighted. The function is S shaped if  α > 1, indicating that small probabilities are 
underweighted and large probabilities are overweighed.  
1.3.2 Elicitation 
Similar to TCN, the Matzikama farmers were given three sets of multiple price lists 
(MPLs) with pair wise lotteries sheets2. The first two lists (i.e. Series 1 and 2) had a series of 
14 decision rows each, with both being gain only lotteries. The third sheet (Series 3) had both 
gain and loss lotteries with 7 decision rows3. Subjects have a choice between lottery A or lottery 
B in each row. The lotteries were framed to represent farming seasons with lottery A 
representing the outcome if farmers chose to use traditional seeds and lotteries B representing 
the outcome if farmers chose to use improved seeds.  The payoffs are dependent on whether or 
not there is sufficient rainfall for yields to be good. The premise of this framing is that improved 
seeds require more rain relative to traditional seeds. The probabilities in the lotteries 
represented the probabilities of good rainfall for the high payoffs and probabilities of bad rain 
for the low payoffs. The payoffs represent the yields in a farming season. 
                                                             
2 A sample of the multiple price lists are presented in appendix 2 
3 Sample of the list are presented in Appendix 2 
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 Subjects were asked to select the row they wanted to switch from lottery A (traditional 
seeds) to lottery B (Improved seeds) (participants could only select one option (A or B) in each 
decision row). The probabilities of outcomes in the first two series were fixed all through the 
row. The first row of series 1 had lottery A offering a 30 percent chance of receiving a high 
payoff and a 70 percent chance of receiving a low payoff. The first row of lottery B offers a 10 
percent chance of receiving a higher payoff than the high payoff in lottery A and a 90 percent 
chance of receiving a lower payoff than the low payoff in lottery B. In series 2, the first row of 
lottery A offers a 90 percent chance of receiving a high payoff and a 10 percent chance of 
receiving a low payoff.  The first row of lottery B offers a 70 percent chance of receiving a 
higher payoff than the high payoff in lottery A and a 30 percent chance of receiving a lower 
payoff than the low payoff in lottery B.    
In Series 1, the outcome in lottery A is also fixed but in lottery B the payoffs change as 
one goes down the rows until the expected payoff of lottery B ultimately surpasses that of 
lottery A. In both Series 1 and 2, the more risk averse a participant is the further down the row 
they switch to lottery B. In Series 3, the subjects had a 50 percent probability of a positive 
payoff (loss) and a 50 percent probability of a negative payoff (loss) in both lotteries. The 
expected value of lottery A decreases and lottery B increases as we move down the rows. The 
more risk-averse a participant is the further down the row they switch to Lottery B.  Subsequent 
to the completion of each MPL, a subject would draw a numbered ball from numbered balls 
that were placed in a bag. The balls were numbered 1 to 14  for Series 1 and Series 2 and 1 to 
7 for Series 3.The chosen ball then determined what decision row was to be played for money4.  
Rainfall probabilities were also denoted by 10 numbered balls. For example, for traditional 
seeds in series 1, 3 balls represented good rain fall levels while 7 balls represented poor rainfall 
levels. The rainfall level is determined by one of the subject selecting a ball from the bag.  
   The MPL lotteries in TCN were structured so that the switching points of the 3 series 
produce a permutation of the prospect theory parameters risk aversion, non-liner probability 
weighting and loss aversion. Series 1 and 2 estimate the parameters sigma (the measure of risk 
aversion) and alpha (the measure for probability weighting). In Series 1, a set of sigma and 
alpha (σ, α) combinations that rationalise the switching points are estimated. Another 
combination of sets that justifies the switching point is found for series 2. For example, if a 
subject switched in row 6 of series 1, the values of sigma and alpha that can rationalise the 
                                                             
4 Summary of Payoffs is presented in table 4. 
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switch is (0.5, 0.4) (0.6, 0.5), (0.7, 0.6), (0.8, 0.7), (0.9, 0.8), (1.0, 0.9). This implies the 
following inequalities:  
5  + exp[−(−  0.3) ] (20  − 5 ) < 2.5  + exp [−(−  0.1) ](55  − 2.5 ) 
5  + exp[−(−  0.3) ] (20  − 5 ) > 2.5  + exp [−(−  0.1) ](62.5  − 2.5 ) 
If a subject switched in row 6 in series 2 this implies the following inequalities: 
15  + exp[−(−  0.9) ] (20  − 15 ) < 2.5  + exp [−(−  0.7) ](31  − 2.5 ) 
15  + exp[−(−  0.9) ] (20  − 15 ) > 2.5  + exp [−(−  0.7) ](32.5  − 2.5 ) 
The combination of sigma and alpha that can rationalise the switch is (0.5, 1), (0.6, 0.9), (0.7, 
0.8), (0.8, 0.7), (0.9, 0.6), (1, 0, and 0.5). The crossing point is thus (0.8, 0.7).  
In TCN, the coefficient of loss aversion (λ) is derived from Series 3: conditional on the 
value of sigma derived from Series 1 and Series 2, the switching point in Series 3 implies a 
range of values for  λ. The TCN method produces interval values for the loss aversion 
parameter. For the values of sigma 0.8 and the subject switched in the 6th row of series 3, this 
implies the following inequalities:  
(-λ)(-(-2^0.8))(0.5) + (12.5^0.8) (0.5)> (-λ) (-(-10.5^0.8)) (0.5) + (15^0.8) (0.5), 
(-λ)(-(-2^0.8))(0.5) + (2^0.8) (0.5)> (-λ) (-(10.5^0.8)) (0.5) + (15^0.8) (0.5), 
(-λ)(-(-2^0.8))(0.5) + (0.5^0.8) (0.5)> (-λ) (-(-10.5^0.8)) (0.5) + (15^0.8) (0.5), 
(-λ)(-(-2^0.8))(0.5) + (0.5^0.8) (0.5)> (-λ) (-(-8^0.8)) (0.5) + (15^0.8) (0.5), 
(-λ)(-(-4^0.8))(0.5) + (0.5^0.8) (0.5)> (-λ) (-(-8^0.8)) (0.5) + (15^0.8) (0.5), 
(-λ)(-(-4^0.8))(0.5) + (0.5^0.8) (0.5) < (-λ) (-(-7^0.8)) (0.5) + (15^0.8) (0.5), 
(-λ)(-(-4^0.8))(0.5)+ (0.5^0.8) (0.5) < (-λ) (-(-5.5^0.8)) (0.5) + (15^0.8) (0.5) 
The implied interval of Lambda is: 3.62896< λ <4.76259. Note that if subjects switch in row 
1 or never switch, the intervals are censored.  
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 Rainfall Traditional Seeds Improved Seeds 
1 
 R20 if  R38.5 if  
 R16 if  R1 if  
Figure 1: Sample Lottery Task 
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1.4 Determinants of Risk Aversion, Non-Linear Probability Weighting and Loss 
Aversion 
In this section, we assess the determinants of risk aversion, non-linear probability 
weighting and loss aversion. The results presented in Table 5 are, ceteris paribus,  outcomes of 
the Ordinary Least Square regressions on normalised sigma (Risk aversion)(1) and alpha 
(Nonlinear probability weighting)(2), respectively, and interval regression on lambda (Loss 
Aversion)(3). Positive values on sigma and interval lambda regressions denote an increase in 
risk aversion and loss aversion respectively while positive values on alpha indicate an increase 
in the weighting of small probabilities relative to large probabilities.  In this paper, we replace 
σ = - σ and α = - α  in order to have a measure that shows a higher σ  and α denoting greater 
risk aversion and increase in the overweighting of small probabilities, respectively.  
 The explanatory variables are the farmer’s age,  gender (dummy variable = 1 if the 
farmer is female),  education level of farmer, if the farmer is the primary bread winner of the 
household,  monthly household income, if the farmer  has an alternative source of paid 
employment besides farming, the farmers farm experience in years, household size,  if the 
household income is below the average relative household income in their community; relative 
income here is the ratio of the individuals household income and mean income in the 
community.  
In Table 5(1), our findings show that household size (p-values =0.004; 0.011) is 
negatively correlated with risk aversion. This is similar to the finding of Wik et al. (2004).  
Household size can represent a wealth factor. Bigger households imply a larger household 
labour force or wealth generating capacity. Furthermore household size may be correlated with 
lower risk aversion because of the greater opportunities for risk sharing i.e. an implicit form of 
insurance for members of the household (Wik et al., 2004). This is consistent with Barr (2003) 
who find that risk aversion decreases when individuals can pool risk.  We find that primary 
bread winners are less loss averse than non-primary bread winners (p-value = 0.093). There 
were no statistical significant effects on the coefficient from the regressions on nonlinear 
probability weighting in 5(2). In 5(3), we find that primary bread winners (p-value = 0.020; 
022) are significantly less loss averse than non-primary bread winners. Primary bread winners 
have greater command over the resources of their households and a greater burden in terms of 
bringing in income to satisfy household consumption (Rouse and Kitching, 2006, Jayawarna 
et al., 2013) which may create a bias for upside risk (variability in financial gains) compared 
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to downside risk (variability in financial losses).  We further find that farm experience (p-values 
= 0.064; 0.034) is related to loss aversion indicating a greater concern for downside risk. 
Greater household monthly income is related to lower loss aversion, but its effect is minor.  
The negative sign is nonetheless expected given that the disutility from loss of income 
decreases as income increases.  
Table 5: Determinants of Risk Preferences 
  Sigma(RA) Alpha (PW) Lambda(LA) 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Age -0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.037 -0.038 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.027) (0.031) 
Female 0.046 0.037 0.052 0.056 0.653 0.480 
 (0.057) (0.059) (0.042) (0.046) (0.852) (0.917) 
Education Level  -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.205 -0.289 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.176) (0.196) 
Primary Bread Winner -0.091 -0.114 -0.014 -0.059 -1.896 -2.037 
 (0.064) (0.067)* (0.054) (0.056) (0.817)** (0.892)** 
Employed -0.014 -0.013 0.025 0.048 -0.729 -0.770 
 (0.052) (0.059) (0.053) (0.064) (0.752) (0.855) 
Farm Experience in Yrs. 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.125 0.141 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.067)* (0.067)** 
Household Size -0.036 -0.035 -0.008 -0.004 -0.225 -0.280 
 (0.012)*** (0.013)** (0.010) (0.010) (0.199) (0.197) 
Below Avg. Rel. Inc.  -0.010 - -0.054 - 0.777 - 
 (0.053) - (0.050) - (0.720) - 
Household Income - 0.000 - -0.000 - -0.000 
 - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)* 
lnsigma_cons 0.078 0.085 -0.415 -0.436 7.145 9.108 
 (0.192) (0.223) (0.167)** (0.184)** (3.128)** (3.548)** 
Constant - - - - 1.185 1.190 
 - - - - (0.133)*** (0.145)*** 
Observations 84 74 84 74 84 74 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
1.5 Determinants of Technology Uptake 
In this section, we consider seven farm technologies and practices, namely, drought 
resistant crops, improved seeds, intercropping, fertilizer, organic manure, wind breaks and 
irrigation. The explanatory variables are the same as in section 1.4. Additional explanatory 
variables are the dummy variables Rain (Frequency and Timing) = 1 if the farmer has perceived 
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any changes in rainfall frequency and timing and ‘0’ if not, Rainfall (level and Intensity) = 1 if 
the farmer has perceived any changes in rainfall level and intensity and ‘0’ if not, and 
Temperature = 1 if the farmer has perceived any changes in temperature levels and ‘0’ if not. 
The determinants of uptake are obtained using logit regressions and the results are presented 
in Table 6 below. The coefficients are the expected changes in the probability of taking up an 
option due to a unit change in the explanatory variable. Two regressions are carried out for 
each uptake option5. Our results indicate that risk aversion (Sigma) increases the likelihood of 
fertilizer uptake (p-value = 0.008, 0.035). We find that the more an individual weights small 
probabilities relative to large probabilities (Alpha) the more likely they are to take up  improved 
seeds (p-value = 0.056, 0.036).6   This result is expected if there is less uncertainty attached to 
improved seeds. 
 We find that females are less likely to take up drought resistant crops (p-values = 0.080; 
0.095), fertilizer (p-values = 0.047; 0.037) and manure (p-value = 0.069). Education level is 
seen to be negatively related to uptake of intercropping (p-value = 0.062). This contradicts the 
common assumption that the education level of farmers has a positive effect on uptake because 
of the connection between education and knowledge on farm technology (Knowler et al., 
2007).  Nonetheless, more educated individuals are more likely to have better non farming jobs 
and may, therefore, be less driven to invest more time in intercropping which requires a more 
disciplined farming structure. 
Greater household size is related to greater likelihood of fertilizer uptake (p-values = 
0.019; 0.059), this may be linked to the greater labour power or pooled resources that 
accompany increased household size. Employment is seen to be related to lower likelihood of 
uptake of manure (p-values = 0.001; 0.000). This can be expected since having an alternative 
income source means another method of satisfying consumption. Alternative employment can 
reduce the importance of farming in a household and in so doing diminish the importance of 
improving farm practices (Knowler et al., 2007) or engaging in practices that involve high 
effort levels.  
                                                             
5 The second set of regressions include all variables while the first set of regressions exclude the dummy 
variables for below average relative income and climate change perceptions. A third set of regressions which 
include household monthly income  is  in Appendix 3.  
6 It is important to note that there are several categories of improved seeds.  Improved seeds can be seeds that 
are genetically modified to contain more nutrients, generate greater yields or are drought- or disease resistant 
etc. or a combination of these categories. The characteristic of the type of improved seeds are not explicitly 
stated in the survey 
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With the exception of drought resistant crops, having below average relative income 
decrease the likelihood of uptake of all the options namely, improved seeds (p-values = 0.039; 
0.045), intercropping (p-value = 0.066), fertilizer (p-values = 0.015; 0.050), manure (p-values 
= 0.005; 0.007), windbreaks (p-values = 0.015; 0.019) and irrigation(p-values = 0.094,0.012). 
Having below average relative income has a greater effect than household income7. This 
suggests that relative income limits uptake if it is below a certain threshold which is consistent 
with the asset based approach to poverty traps.  Of all the variables explored, the relative 
income position has the most dominant effects, suggesting that poverty trap is the most 
important feature of slow technology diffusion. Nonetheless, this effect may be specific to 
South Africa due to its unique legacy of racially polarised income levels. The limitation to self-
advancement are not only characterised by asset constraints but also distinctive structural 
exclusion which deepens the magnitude of the poverty trap.  
Our results indicate that a perceived change in rainfall frequency and timing increases 
the likelihood of fertiliser uptake (p-value = 0.037). This is expected given that fertilisers can 
be used to supplement the nutrients for plants in the event of inadequate rainfall. In contrast, a 
perceived change in rainfall levels and intensity decreases the likelihood of fertilizer usage (p-
value = 0.093). We find that perceived temperature changes increase the likelihood of uptake 
of intercropping (p-value = 0.000) and also fertilizer (p-value = 0.092). These results indicated 
that there is a significant relation between perceived changes in climate and the uptake of new 
technologies and therefore also the importance to educate farmers via training programs, 
making information more accessible via early warning systems and other information 
campaigns. 
 
 
 
                                                             
7 See Appendix 3. 
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1.6 Conclusion (Chapter 1) 
Advancements in farm technology and practices have provided farmers with the means 
to improve yields while safeguarding farm productivity against harsh climatic and weather 
events. Nonetheless, there is evidence to suggest that the diffusion of these farm practices and 
technology has been slow. Evidence from economic and behavioural literature suggests that 
there are certain real and psychological attributes of farmers that contribute to the slow uptake 
of farm technology. The real attributes include factors such as relative income, wealth, 
education and the actual risk associated with technology adoption while the psychological 
attributes include factors such as farmers’ perceptions, preferences and emotions.  
In this paper, we carry out an analysis to determine to what extent these real and 
psychological attributes contribute to the farm technology uptake process. Based on our finding 
on the effects of psychological constructs such as individual risk preferences and perceptions, 
we recommend that climate risk management policies need to include a significant amount of 
participatory risk evaluation and strategies. Farmers should be involved in the understanding 
of the risks, be it weather or climate risk, the probabilities they face and in the construction of 
responsive or adaptive strategies (Patt and Schroter, 2008).  An institutional factor that should 
be considered is access to extension services, which provide information on climate and 
technology. Farmers can only construct viable and efficient farm strategies with comprehensive 
and accurate information on impending occurrences such as climate conditions (Smit and 
Skinner, 2002).  
Our finding on the effect of relative household income positon is consistent with the 
poverty trap hypothesis which suggests the existence of an asset threshold with people below 
that threshold being reluctant to take on investment. We find that being below the average 
relative income has a negative effect on all but one of the uptake options we explored. This 
confirms that for low income farm households, there may be a minimum combination of assets 
or economic circumstances necessary to eventually formulate pathways out of poverty (Carter 
and Barret; 2006).    It is unclear as to whether this is as a result of physical or psychological 
constructs or a combination of both.  It nonetheless has the most consistent effect on uptake, 
out of all the determinants we explored, suggesting that it is an extremely crucial factor to the 
technology uptake process. This finding signals the need for stronger proactive actions to 
guarantee access to a minimum package of assets for poor South African farmers, this is 
required for their successful advancement (Adato et al., 2006). An example would be a formal 
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credit system linked to harvest levels in order to reduce the downside risk associated with crop 
production and aid in the overcoming of the asset threshold levels.  It is important to mention 
that the impact of relative income position could also be an emotional construct where people 
compare their activities with those of others in their income group and develop subjective 
norms from their observations regarding the correct strategy or solution (Festinger, 1954; 
Gifford, 2011).  Therefore, mechanisms that support of greater market participation, discourse 
between income groups as well as social capital should be explored.  
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Chapter 2 –Risk Preferences and Poverty Traps: A Look at Urban Smallholder 
Organic Farmers in Cape Town.  
2.1 Introduction 
Agricultural production is an inherently risky enterprise.  Some of the main issues 
regarding risks in agriculture revolve around the level of yields and more recently the 
degradation of the environment as a result of unsustainable agricultural practices. In recent 
years, substantial technological progress has provided farmers with the means and capacity to 
improve farms yields and efficiency while limiting the effects of occurrences, such as weather 
variations, on farm productivity. However, these technologies are not always innocuous to the 
environment. There are concerns about the detrimental impact of current agricultural methods 
on the environment, the growing dependence of agriculture on non-renewable natural capital, 
and the long-run efficiency of agricultural systems that rely on high external-input. And these 
concerns have led to the promotion of sustainable agricultural practices by governmental and 
non-governmental bodies (De sauza et al., 1999). One practice that has been widely promoted 
is organic farming. This method of farming is viewed by some as one that offers answers to 
problems linked to conventional farming such as biodiversity loss, pollution and animal 
wellbeing (Häring et al., 2004; Lampkin, 1994; Lynggaard, 2006; Rigby et al., 2001 and Van 
Mansvelt and Mulder, 1993;  Lapple et al., 2011). 
  Organic farming has been widely supported as an opportunity for small-scale farmers 
in Africa to meet consumption needs and also for commercialization (Green Clippings, 2003 
in Thamaga-Chitja and Hendriks, 2008). Growing consumer support for more health and 
environmental consciousness in developed countries has resulted in a corresponding upsurge 
in the demand for produce from sustainable production methods (Niemeyer and Lombard, 
2003). South Africa, unlike other Sub-Saharan countries, has also seen a considerable growth 
in the domestic market for organic products (Groslink, 2002). As a result, there is a potential 
for local consumer driven organic farming in South Africa that is not dependent solely on the 
export markets from Europe and the USA (Niemeyer and Lombard, 2003). With the right 
incentivising environment, organic agriculture could offer economic development for small 
scale farmers in South Africa (Thamaga-Chitja and Hendriks; 2008). If the adoption of organic 
agricultural practices is seen as an essential characteristic of a mobilization towards more 
sustainable agriculture [and the economic progress of smallholder farmers] then an 
understanding of the determinants of uptake of sustainable technology should be a crucial 
element of policy design (Burton et al.; 1999) 
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One challenge facing the development community is that the diffusion of agricultural 
technology has been slow in developing countries (Feder et al., 1985; Engle-Warnick et al., 
2007; Duflo et al., 2011; Simtowe, 2006, Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 2002; Brick and Visser, 
2014). It has been observed that poor farmers that have difficulty guarding against consumption 
risk respond by selecting low return - low risk agricultural practices (Brick and Visser, 2014). 
This is possibly because uptake of technology does not occur independently from other risk 
related activities (Smit and Skinner, 2002).  Studies have also shown that organic farming may 
be suffering an even greater hindrance from this proclivity for low-risk-low return agricultural 
practices. Organic farming differs from conventional farming in that it depends natural 
processes of the environment and, as a result,  entails specific risk and risk management 
methods. Organic farming practices exclude the effective management devices that have been 
established and used in conventional farming, e.g. synthetic chemicals and antibiotics (Hanson 
et al., 2004) which decrease output variability by increasing agricultural production in adverse 
states of nature (Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1994). Serra and Zilberman (2008) found evidence 
that the ability to control production risk do differ between organic and conventional farms a 
consequence of which is organic farms suffering a higher burden of risk. They thus deduce 
that, to the extent that average profit and variances vary between organic and conventional 
farming, farmers’ risk preferences may contribute to explaining economic behaviour in 
framework of farm technology uptake.  
Current available literature has documented several important factors that influence 
adoption behaviour (Serra and Zilberman; 2008) and technology uptake. These are economic 
factors like financial resources (Maddison, 2007; Nhemachena and Hassan, 2007) and 
observable non-economic factors like personal characteristics (organic farmers have been 
typically found to be better educated and younger relative to conventional growers) (Serra and 
Zilberman; 2008) and, since adoption is still subject to the deliberate decision-making of the 
farmers (Smit and Skinner, 2002), also immaterial personal characteristics like fears.  
Ziervogel et al. (2006) proposes that wealthy farmers are more able to pursue market 
priorities (e.g. planting crops that are more income generating), instead of adaptation priorities 
(e.g. planting crops that are more drought resistance) because they possess resources that make 
them more able to substitute their incomes in the event of loss. Poorer farmers, because of 
lesser access to inputs, will be more inclined to improve their resilience by expanding their 
strategies to counter shocks rather than focus on market priorities.   Panda et.al (2013) find 
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evidence to suggest that total income and total farming income were correlated with changing 
crop variety (i.e. changing from rice to cotton and the use of early maturing crop variety).  Their 
findings show that farm experience, land area irrigated, and access to credit are positively 
related to two farm technology uptake options while crop insurance and water resource are 
each positively linked to the uptake three farm uptake options.  Shiferaw and Holden (1998) 
find that the age of the farmer and adoption of soil conservation techniques are negatively 
correlated, suggesting that older farmers are more resistant to reforming or adopting new farm 
practices.  Niemeyer and Lombard (2003) in looking at the difference between organic and 
conventional farmers find that younger farmers and farmers with higher education levels 
tended practice organic farming more than conventional farmers. They establish that their 
findings abide by innovation theory, which states that innovators are younger and more 
educated. 
Studies on farmers’ decision making and behaviour in developing countries have paid 
close attention to the role of risk preferences (Feder, 1980; Just and Zilberman, 1983, Liu and 
Huang, 2010).  One concern has been risk averting behaviour prompted by low income 
smallholder farmers’ incapacity to transfer risks to third parties which is exacerbated by 
constraint such as inadequate or absent insurance, credit, and labour markets. This risk averting 
behaviour is alleged to be responsible for the risk-induced poverty trap (Yesuf and Bluffstone, 
2009) in which farmers in developing countries find themselves.  
The constraints and factors we have mentioned affect technology uptake directly but in 
this study we are particularly interested in looking as their effects on uptake through their 
effects on risk aversion. It is important to mention that there are two component of  risk 
aversion, namely, pure risk-aversion and market risk-aversion (Binswanger and Sillers, 1983; 
Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990 in Knight et al., (2003)  Pure risk-aversion is a manifestation of 
inherent preference (a psychological trait) and is defined scientifically by the concavity of an 
individual’s utility function. Market risk-aversion, on the other hand, results from the 
interaction of pure risk-preference with constraints and risk mitigating opportunities (i.e. it is 
partially determined by one’s ability to shoulder risk). With the same risk-preferences, i.e. pure 
risk-aversion, farmers may exhibit dissimilar behaviour in reaction to risk if they have differing 
levels of access to capital, credit or differ in their aptitude for mitigating risk (Masson, 1972 in 
Knight et al., 2003) through for example accumulated human capital such as education. 
Education, by improving farmers’ aptitude for receiving and decoding information, may 
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directly reduce market risk-aversion.  It may also decrease market risk-aversion indirectly 
through its influence on wealth and access to credit (Knight et al. 2003).  
 Another preference that has been identified in literature as being important to the 
technology adoption process is preference for gains over losses. One key empirical observation 
with regards gains and losses is that individuals tend to exhibit more sensitivity to losses 
compared to proportionate gains (Sebora and Cornwall, 1995). A consequence of this is that 
the utility function for losses is steeper than that of gains (Köbberling and Wakker, 2005).  This 
phenomenon is known as ‘Loss aversion’ and is scientifically denoted by the kink in the utility 
function below the horizontal axis. There are several scenarios in which a farmer may be loss 
averse. The first is that the farmer perceives the level of risks and [absolute] payoffs to be 
similar between gains and losses but likes risk in one of the domains compared to the other. On 
the other hand, risk aversion can differ between the gain and loss domains because the farmer 
perceives the risk and absolute payoff levels to differ between gains and losses but likes the 
risk associated with both domains equally (Weber et al., 2002).  
Empirical evidence has in fact established that loss aversion exists and is also 
influenced by similar factors and constraints as risk aversion and, similar to risk aversion, it 
may also have an effect on technology uptake. A number of studies have explored the relation 
between risk or loss aversion and farm technology uptake. Liu (2013) finds that Chinese 
farmers that exhibit greater loss aversion adopt Bt cotton later. Ward and Singh (2013), in their 
sample of study, determine that loss aversion is correlated with a switch from traditional rice 
seeds to a new variety. Hill (2005) using a sample of Ugandan farmers, finds that risk aversion 
is correlated with replanting of coffee trees.  Serra and Zilberman (2008) find risk aversion to 
decreases the uptake of organic farming processes.  Burton et al. (1999) in looking at the 
contributing factor to uptake decision of organic production processes found that attitudinal 
factors are linked to adoption. This suggests that any study of the determinants of the adoption 
of organic techniques which is limited to farm-level financial factors may be omitting important 
features of the decision making process (Burton et al.; 1999). As previously mentioned, we 
include two attitudinal variable namely risk and loss aversion in our study and our focus is on 
the urban organic smallholder agriculture in the city of Cape Town South Africa.  
Urban agriculture is roughly defined as ‘the cultivation, processing, marketing and 
distribution of food crops and products in an urban environment and for the benefit of urban 
residents’ (City of Cape Town, 2007:3). This form of agriculture is particularly important 
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because of its ability to support cities’ poverty alleviation strategies by giving marginalised 
urban residents sources of income and employment that are related to small scale agricultural 
production (Hovorka et al., 2009). Urban agriculture has a great potential in a South African 
where continuing poverty and social marginalization are strongly related (Adato et al., 2006). 
Urban agriculture combined with organic practices can make a useful contribution to the 
sustainable development process in South Africa.  
In this chapter, the sample of study consists of 82 small scale and subsistence farmers, 
in the urban informal settlements of Cape Town, who are members of Abalimi Bezekhaya’s 
Harvest of Hope Scheme. Abalimi Bezekhaya is an urban agriculture (UA) and environmental 
action (EA) non-government organization (NGO) functioning in some of the urban informal 
settlement in around Cape Town South Africa. Harvest of Hope is an organic vegetable box 
project which originated from a partnership between the South African Institute for 
Entrepreneurship, the Ackerman Pick ‘n Pay Foundation and Abalimi Bezekhaya (De Satge 
and William, 2008). The Harvest of Hope Scheme offers a means of marketing excess produce 
on behalf of farmers.  The farmers that partake in the project cultivate organic produce in 
vegetable gardens in Cape Town.  Information on farmer characteristics are obtained from 
survey data whilst risk preferences are obtained using a series of lottery type experiments 
conducted with the farmers, which are then used to estimate risk and loss aversion parameters.  
The chapter is presented in 6 sections. In the introduction, section 2.1, we give an overview of 
current theory and literature regarding the study.  Section 2.2 describes the survey data and 
sample statistics. Section 2.3 presents an outline of the methodology and elicitation method 
used to estimate risk and loss aversion. Section 2.4 presents the regression results for the 
determinants of risk preferences and loss aversion. Section 2.5 shows the regression results for 
determinants of organic farm technology uptake. Section 2.6 is the conclusion. 
 
2.2 Sample 
This study uses a sample of 82 small scale and subsistence farmers, in the urban 
informal settlements of Cape Town South Africa, who participate in the Harvest of Hope 
scheme of Abalimi Bezekhaya8.  The data was obtained by Martine Visser and Kerri Brick of 
the Environmental Research Policy Unit EPRU, University of Cape Town. The sample 
                                                             
8 The questionnaire can be found in Appendix 4. 
38 
 
summary statistics are presented in Tables 1. In Table 1, the average age of farmers in the 
Sample is 54 years. Most of the farmers are female, making up approximately 62 percent of 
the sample.  Approximately 19 percent of the farmers have another source of employment 
besides farming. Average education level in the sample is low with the average attainment 
being primary school education. 24 percent of the farmers stated that they had not completed 
primary school and only 18 have a matric certificate.  The average monthly household income 
is also low with the average being approximately R696. Only 30 percent of the farmers had 
some form of insurance at the time of the survey.  66.7 percent of the sample had previously 
applied for a loan while 29.3 percent have had some form of formal insurance.  
Summary statistics for self-reported indicators of risk preference are also included. The 
respondents were asked to indicate what type of person they were in terms of risk attitude, the 
respondents had the option of choosing between 'Often takes risks', 'Sometimes takes risks' or 
'Never takes risks'. 45.2 percent of the sample indicated that they never take risks, 34.4 percent 
indicated that they sometime take risks and 16.4 percent stated that they often takes risks. This 
subjective measures of risk preference, despite its biases, is consistent with results from 
empirical studies that found most farmers to be risk averse (Escalante et al. 2001).  
Table 1: Basic Summary Statistics 
  Mean Standard Deviation 
       
Age  53.852 14.365 
Male  38.00% 48.80% 
Female  62.00% 48.80% 
No Schooling  13.40% 34.30% 
Education Level  8.61 4.27 
    
Incomplete Primary Schooling  24.40% 43.20% 
Complete Primary Schooling  12.20% 32.90% 
Some Secondary Schooling  31.70% 46.80% 
Grade 12   7.30% 26.20% 
Matric Certificate  18.30% 38.90% 
    
Higher Education  9.80% 29.90% 
Employed  19.10% 39.60% 
Monthly HH Income  696.863 597.837 
Below Avg. Rel. HH Income  52.941% 50.664% 
Farm Experience in yrs.  4.375 3.939 
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Loan  66.70% 47.80% 
Insurance  29.30% 45.80% 
    
Often takes risks  16.40% 37.30% 
Sometime takes risks  38.40% 49.00% 
Never takes risks  45.20% 50.10% 
    
Sample size:82 
In the survey, farmers were asked if they used a number of farming technology and 
practices. In this study, we explore 6 of the option, namely, Intercropping, Organic Manure, 
Mulching, Improved Seeds and Windbreaks. The summary statistics for the uptake of these 
options are presented in Table 2 below. 52.4 percent of the farmers stated that they used 
Intercropping, 71.95 percent stated that they used organic manure, 71.17 percent of the farmer 
stated that they used mulching, 48.78 percent stated that they used improved seeds and 50 
percent stated that they used wind breaks.  
Deressa et al. (2009) using a sample from the Nile Basin of Ethiopia found an adoption 
rate of 58 percent. Hassan and Nhemachena (2008) analysed the contributing factors to farm 
climate adaptation measures in Africa, they uses a cross-sectional survey of more than 8000 
farms across 11 countries in African. They found that 63 percent of their sample had adopted 
at least 1 farm strategy.  One possible explanation for the high uptake rate found in our sample 
is the effect of NGO and government support provided to the farmers. 
The Harvest of Hope scheme entails that Abalimi provides the farmers with inputs, 
infrastructure, technical advice, institutional support and organised production and marketing 
practice. Intermediaries are removed in the distribution system thus permitting farmers to 
improve profits (Jarosz 2008; Kirkland, 2008).  The farmers pay for seedlings, seed and 
electricity while Abalimi or other agencies like the Department of Agriculture, the Department 
of Social Services and the City of Cape Town cover the expenses of organic fertiliser, manure, 
transport, mulch, fencing, irrigation infrastructure, transport and marketing (De Satgé and 
Williams, 2008).  
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Table 2: Technology Uptake 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
   
Intercropping 52.44% 50.25% 
Organic manure 71.95% 45.20% 
Mulching 73.17% 44.58% 
Improved Seeds 48.78% 50.29% 
Wind breaks 50.00% 50.31% 
      
Sample Size: 82   
 
2.3 Estimating the Risk and Loss Aversion Parameters 
2.3.1 Methodology 
Owing to the assumption that risk preferences have sign dependence, we assume a loss 
aversion index (λ). We then consider a Certainty Equivalent CE gamble where the respondents 
are asked to equate a sure outcome y to a gamble ( ,  ,  ).  M and m being the absolute value 
maximum and minimum outcomes, respectively. Outcome y is varied in order to get to the 
indifference point. Two outcomes are then considered under the assumption of expected utility: 
 ~( ,  ,  ) and  ( ) =   ( ) + (1 −  ) ( ) =  .  We normalise the CE by assuming 
that   ( ) = 1  and  ( ) = 0. Therefore, for outcomes perceived as losses we 
assume  ( )           =   ( ).  The CE is thus; |CE| =
| |   | |
| |   | |
 . The higher the CE in the 
gains frame the greater amount an individual will need in order to make the riskier option 
equivalent to the certain option. This implies that the less risk averse and individual will be in 
the gains frame. The higher the |CE| in the loss frame the greater the absolute value of the 
amount an individual will need in order to make the riskier option equivalent to the certain 
option. This implies that the less risk averse and individual will be in the loss frame. 
We estimate the risk aversion parameters using the CE directly.  We do not assume any 
specific parametric functions.  While there are benefits to parametric studies, outcomes may be 
subject to the specific parametric function selected. Non-parametric estimation, on the other 
hand, permits reliable tests of crucial characteristics concerning the shapes of the utility 
function (Abdellaoui, 2000).  
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Loss aversion is modelled using a basic utility function u and a loss aversion index. The 
Utility U is the utility that is observable and it constitutes the loss aversion index   >  0   and 
the basic utility u. The parameter   represents the rate at which losses are evaluated compared 
to gains (Kobberling and Wakker, 2005). The equation is formally written as: 
                                                 ( ) =   
 ( )      ≥ 0
  ( )     ≤ 0
                                        Equation 2.1                            
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) definition of loss aversion considers −  (− ) >  ( ) for 
all    > 0. The loss aversion parameter is then evaluated at the mean or median of 
− (− )/ ( )  over related  . We use Tversky and Kahneman (1992) where loss aversion 
is − (−$1)/ ($1). This is the limiting case of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
2.3.2 Elicitation and Estimation 
Brick and Visser (2014) elicited preference by use of multiple price lists (MPL).  A 
MPL is a fairly simple method for eliciting values. With the aim of estimating a willingness to 
pay for goods, the subject are presented with a range of ordered prices in a tabular form, one 
per row,  the respondents can indicate whether or not they accept each price (Andersen et al., 
2006). In order words, it elicits the prices that are equivalent to the value of a good for each 
individual. Similarly Brick and Visser (2014) we use a multiple price list to obtain the certainty 
equivalent value of a gamble for each respondent. In the experiments, the test subjects were 
offered three gambles. In each gamble, they were asked to make a series of choices between a 
risky prospect and a sure payoff that was increasing in absolute value9.  
Brick and Visser (2014) following Moore and Eckel (2003), presented an 
increasing/decreasing certain payoff in Option 1 which ranges from R3 to R26, in absolute 
value. The payoff increases (decreases), in R1 increments, for the gains (loss) frame decision 
sheets. This incremental increase or decrease is the same in all the decision sheets. In option 2, 
the payoff is the same all through the decision rows. Subjects could either earn or lose R50 for 
the gain and loss frame sheet, respectively, or nothing. A significantly risk averse participant 
would select option 1 in row 1 of the decision sheet, and a very risk-loving participant would 
select option 2 in the final row of the decision sheet. The row at which a subject moves from 
                                                             
9 A sample of the framing for the decision sheet is presented in Appendix 5 
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option 2 to option 1, for gains the frame, or option 1 to option 2, for loss frame, is used to 
approximate the individuals’ certainty equivalent. 
The instructions were cautiously formulated to make the logical inconsistency of 
multiple switching clear to the subjects. After participants had gone through the instructions, a 
practice round was carried out, were the participants were asked to identify the row in which 
they opted to switch from option 2 to option 1 in the gain frame and option 1 to option two in 
the loss frame. Two of the participants demonstrated multiple switching and were thus omitted 
from the sample.  Note that several examples were given to the subjects, including: choosing 
only option 1, choosing only option 2 and switching from option 2 to option 1 (for gains) and 
option 1 to option   2 (for losses) at various rows. Consequently, participants did not perceive 
having a switching point at a particular point to be required. 
Following the collection of the decision sheets for each gamble, each subject drew a 
ball from a bag in order to determine the row in the decision sheet that was to be played for 
money. Due to the prevalence of low education and numeracy levels in the sample, the 
probabilities linked with each gamble were represented on a spinning wheel. The wheel had 
two sections, one black and one white, which were equivalent to the probabilities in the relevant 
gamble. Ensuing the spinning of the wheel, if a participant chose option 2 in the relevant row 
being played and the arrow points to the black section, then participant would gain or lose R50; 
similarly, if the arrow points to white, the participant will gain or lose nothing.  Information 
was symmetric between the experimenter and the subjects. Both knew the row to be played for 
money and the outcome that would result from spinning the wheel. 
The summary statistics and graphs for the distribution of risk aversion and loss aversion 
obtain in the lottery type experiment are presented in the Figures 1 and 2 below. The risk 
aversion parameters are normalized so that the midpoint, 0.5, signifies risk neutrality.  Risk 
aversion measures below 0.5 indicate risk-averse preferences whilst risk aversion measures 
above 0.5 indicate risk-seeking. Individuals that exhibit extreme risk aversion will have a risk 
aversion measures close to zero, whilst individuals that exhibit extreme risk seeking will have 
risk aversion measures close to 1. The average risk aversion measures are 0.175, 0.225 and 
0.326 for the 30, 50 and 70 percent probabilities in the gains frame. This indicates that most of 
the respondents are risk averse in the gains frame with risk aversion decreasing as the 
probability of gains increases.  
43 
 
In the loss frame, the average  risk aversion measures was much higher than that of 
gains, The measure indicates that, on average, the farmers exhibit risk seeking behaviour in 
this frame. The risk preference measures in the loss frame are 0.514, 0.510, and 0.581 at the 
30, 50 and 70 percent probability, respectively. Consistent with Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
and most literature, this implies greater sensitivity to losses compared to gains because the 
certainty equivalents of losses are higher.  It can also be seen that, on average, risk aversion in 
the loss frame decreases with the increase in the probability of loss. If we relax the assumption 
of strict risk neutrality, the average risk preference over losses could at the margin be classified 
as risk neutrality since all the risk preference measures in the loss frame are close to 0.5. The 
loss aversion indexes are 2.97, 2.62 and 1.13 at the 30, 50 and 70 percent probabilities, 
respectively. We find that the loss aversion index decreases as the probability of gain/losses 
increases.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Risk Aversion(Gains Frame) 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Loss Aversion 
 
  
2.4 Determinants of Risk Aversion and Loss Aversion 
We carry out regressions to determine the human capital and socio-economic 
characteristics that affect risk and loss aversion. Table 3 shows the result of the Panel Data 
Tobit regressions with random effects. The regressions describe the relationship between a 
non-negative dependent variable and an independent variable.  Coefficients are ceteris paribus 
marginal effects for an average individual. We multiply the preference parameters by -1 so that 
a positive coefficient indicates an increase in risk or loss aversion.  
The independent variables are;  dummy variables session 1,2 and 3;  these indicate the 
experiment session in which the farmers participated in, dummy variables for the 30 percent 
and 70 percent probability of Gain/losses;  this is represented by a variable = 1 if the lottery 
type experiment had a 30 percent or 70 percent probability of loss or gains and 0 otherwise,  
the farmer’s age,  dummy variable = 1 if the farmer is female,  education level of the farmer,  
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monthly household income, dummy variable = 1 if the farmer  has an alternative source of paid 
employment besides farming, the farmers farm experience in years, household size,  dummy 
variable = 1 if the household has below the average relative household income; relative income 
here is the ratio of the individuals household income and mean income in the sample.  
Our findings indicate that age (p-value = 0.031; 0.042) is related to increased risk 
aversion. Education is correlated to lower risk (p-value = 0.013; 0.016) and loss aversion (p-
value = 0.028; 0.010). Employed individuals are less risk averse (p-value = 0.000; 0.000) than 
individuals that are unemployed. Farm experience (p-value = 0.049; 0.017) and household 
income (p-value = 0.004) are related to less loss aversion.  These effects are expected since 
education, farm experience and employment are all factors that are linked to greater earning 
capacity and greater earnings imply lower relative income risk and loss. Furthermore, 
education increases the ability to process outcomes thus decreasing uncertainty and resulting 
in lower level of risk and loss aversion. 
Table 3: Determinant of Risk and Loss Aversion 
  Risk Aversion  Loss Aversion 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Session 2 0.071 0.097 -6.724 -3.890 
 (0.099) (0.098) (2.422)** (2.304)+ 
Session 3 0.158 0.187 -8.515 -5.115 
 (0.128) (0.125) (2.641)** (2.387)* 
30% Prob. Gains/Losses 0.037 0.037 1.532 1.760 
 (0.064) (0.064) (1.320) (1.401) 
70% Prob. Gains/Losses -0.043 -0.043 -0.836 -0.736 
 (0.064) (0.064) (1.365) (1.452) 
Age 0.007 0.006 -0.071 -0.074 
 (0.003)* (0.003)* (0.048) (0.051) 
Female 0.054 0.057 -0.127 -0.586 
 (0.072) (0.073) (1.515) (1.607) 
Education Level -0.024 -0.024 -0.437 -0.532 
 (0.010)* (0.010)* (0.199)* (0.208)* 
Employment -0.418 -0.430 -0.199 -0.489 
 (0.097)** (0.098)** (1.710) (1.815) 
Farm Experience in Yrs. 0.006 0.005 -0.412 -0.521 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.209)* (0.218)* 
Household Size 0.006 0.007 -0.292 -0.265 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.279) (0.299) 
Households Income -0.000 _ -0.004 _ 
 (0.000)  (0.001)**  
Below Avg. Relative HH Inc. _ 0.093 _ 1.896 
  (0.070)  (1.346) 
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Constant 0.553 0.423 22.721 18.008 
 (0.243)* (0.233)+ (4.620)** (4.618)** 
Wald Chi Squared 46.39 44.68  39.76 29.86 
Prob > Chi Squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 
DF 11 11 11 11 
Standard errors in parentheses  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
2.5 Technology Uptake: Survey  
We consider the socio economic and human capital factors that influence uptake and 
whether or not they impact uptake through risk and loss aversion. We look at 6 organic farming 
options, namely, Intercropping, Organic Manure, Mulching, Improved Seeds and Windbreaks. 
Windbreaks are generally trees or shrubs planted in an order that provides shielding to 
protect soil from erosion by wind. Wind breaks which are the core pest control for the Abalimi 
organic gardens are supplied to the farmers at no cost. Mulching is also used by the farmers to 
prevent from wind erosion. It is a process of using a layer of a protective material (e.g. grass 
clippings, straw and stones) to cover the top of the soil.  Abalimi supplies mulching material 
from their gardens to the farmers. The main issue identified with using mulch in the gardens is 
that it attracts snails however this occurs when the mulch is not used properly. Increased snails 
means increased labour burden to the farmers. The improved seed used by Abalimi farmers are 
not of the genetically modified variety as these go against the rules of production in the gardens. 
The improved seeds are thus seeds and seedlings of the hybrid variety. Abalimi provides seeds 
to farmers at a cost while the department of agriculture sometimes gives free seeds to farmers 
and this is mostly linked to start ups and training. The alternative to hybrid seeds is traditional 
seeds which are seeds of the open pollinated variety. Abalimi encourages the farmers to use 
the open pollinated variety as the seeds can be collected and used in the next planting season 
however Abalimi reported that the farmers prefer to use the hybrid seeds. Two reasons that 
they provided was that first, the outcomes of the open pollinated variety are more uncertain 
and there is less public information on the open pollinated variety thus making them the more 
risky option, and second, there has been a move toward hybridization and experts often 
recommend the hybrids and even though hybrid seeds are costly, on the micro farm small scale, 
the costs are not substantial. 
47 
 
Organic manure is also used by the farmers in the gardens.  Organic manures are 
fertilizers sourced from animal or vegetable matter.  Abalimi supplies free cow manure and 
compost to the farmers. The government also often supplies provides organic manure to the 
farmers. Abalimi stated that the main problem with manure usage was shortages. When there 
is a shortage the farmers themselves have to buy organic manure. The application of organic 
manure in the gardens is not labour intensive or time consuming. Furthermore, its use has a 
high payoff in the long run and in the short run it has a high payoff when used in abundance. 
However because of past experience with shortages, some of the farmers tend to under fertilize 
and get poor results. Intercropping is a technique that is highly recommended to the farmers. It 
involves the cultivation of two or more crops in proximity. The aim of the use of intercropping 
is to generate greater yields on a piece of land by using resources that would otherwise not be 
used by a single crop both spatially and over time.  Abalimi encourages the use of 
intercropping. Intercropping does not take up labour or time and has a high payoff if properly 
manage however it requires a more disciplined fertilizing regime. 
Table 4 presents the results of the logit regressions of adoption of organic farm 
technology10. The dependent variable is a dummy variable with 1 indicating that the individual 
adopted a specific option and 0 indicating that the respondent did not. The coefficients obtained 
in the logit regressions are, ceteris paribus, marginal effects. They are the expected changes in 
the probability of adopting an option due to a unit change in the explanatory variable. We find 
that increased loss aversion is related to greater likelihood of uptake of organic manure (p-
value = 0.055). Older individuals are less likely to use organic manure (p-value = 0.013; 0.004), 
mulch (p-value =.043; 0.058) and are more likely to take up improved seeds (p-value = 0.007; 
0.005). Primary bread winners (p-value = 0.000; 0.000) are more likely to take up mulching. 
Farm experience increases the likelihood of intercropping uptake (p-value = 0.096) and 
windbreaks (p-value = 0.038; 0.033) uptake. Education increases the likelihood of 
intercropping (p-value = 0.091; 0.050), improved seeds (p-value = 0.046; 0.022) and 
windbreaks (p-value = 0.002; 0.004) uptake.  Household size increases the likelihood of 
mulching (p-value = 0.048; 0.047) and improved seeds (p-value = 0.000; 0.000) uptake and 
decreased the likelihood of manure (p-value = 0.023; 0.036) uptake. We find that employed 
individuals are more likely to take up mulching (p-value = 0.012; 0.009) and windbreaks (p-
                                                             
10 Results with Houshold income are presented in Appendix 6 
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value = 0.061; 0.092).  Individuals with below average relative household income are less likely 
mulching (p-value = 0.019; 0.023) and improved seeds (p-value = 0.000; 0.000).  
Our findings show that the human capital and socio-economic factors namely, farm 
experience, education and employment that are linked to risk aversion, loss aversion and 
greater earning capacity generally influence technology uptake.  However, risk and loss 
aversion are not found to decrease the likelihood of any of the uptake option. Thus, one can 
purport that the human capital and socioeconomic factors are not increasing uptake through 
their effects on risk and loss aversion. Our evidence on relative income position shows that it 
represents significant financial constraints, but it could also be an indication that farmers 
develop subjective norms from their observations regarding the correct strategy or solution 
from other members of their social group (Gifford, 2011).  
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2.6 Conclusion (Chapter 2) 
Many urban small-scale farmers function in greatly constrained settings which are 
characterised by a deficiency in human capital, poor access to land, technology, credit and 
infrastructure for production, technical and institutional backing, market linkages and aptitude 
for farm management. Abalimi Bezekhaya is geared toward providing an extensively 
subsidised production structure and support scheme which systematically removes or alleviated 
these constraints (De Satge and William, 2008).  Such incentives where the risk of organic farm 
technology uptake is shared between the farmers and another party are effective methods of 
overcoming farmers’ adverse sensitivities. Nonetheless, these types of packages are expensive 
and direct financial support systems cannot guarantee the economic practicality of organic farm 
production in the long term (Genius et al., 2006) 
In order to identify alternative means of supporting farmers in the uptake of organic 
farming technology, it is important to look at the characteristics that motivate adoption amongst 
the farmers. Our study finds that even with subsidies in place, low human capital and financial 
obstacles are still major impediments to organic farm technology uptake. This suggests that 
there is a need for the establishment and strengthening of institutional platforms that are geared 
towards greater access to knowledge sharing, information services and training provision for 
organic farmers.  
Our study also show that even though the Harvest of Hope farmers faced minimized 
income risks due to substantial infrastructure and input support, financial constraints still exist. 
This point toward the potential of financial incentives, such as credit schemes targeted at low 
income farmers and linked to organic farm technology, to improve small-scale organic farming. 
Although some level of infrastructure support is needed in order support the entry of farmers 
into the organic farming enterprise, loans as opposed to subsidies are more likely to give more 
market and profit driven incentives to the farmers. The evidence that income groups, as 
opposed to income itself, has a greater effect on uptake suggests a need for greater development 
of social capital and social networks that involve greater information sharing and performance 
linkages between farmers.  
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Chapter 3 - The Link between Insurance and Farm Technology Uptake amongst Small 
Holder Farmers in the Matzikama Municipality: Risk Preferences, Poverty Traps and 
Timing 
3.1 Introduction   
Poor farmers in developing countries face a number constraints that have been found to 
inspire behavioural or cognitive traits that inhibit farm technology uptake. In economic 
literature, one of most explored of these traits is risk aversion. Evidence from majority of the 
studies on agricultural risk management indicate that most farmers are risk averse.  This is 
expected given that small scale farmers in developing countries face a number of risks that are 
inherent to environment which they operate in. Some of the risks are explicit via changes in 
the agro-ecological environment while others are implicit via effects on growth and income 
distribution (IPCC, 2007). The problem facing development stakeholder, in the food growth 
challenge, is thus two-fold. The first is to guarantee that the agricultural system is able to 
comply with food demand which, amongst others, is contingent on the agro-ecological 
requisites of crop production. The second is to ensure that farmers are insulated from short term 
or long term loss of access to resources that are linked to the sufficient consumption of 
necessities like food (Tubiello et al., 2007).  The problems are not independent. For instance, 
farmers that rely wholly on income from agricultural sources are more vulnerable to 
agricultural shocks and, as a result, would have a higher risk of losing access to resources that 
makes consumption possible (Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007). Similarly, in order to limit 
consumption risk, farmers may refrain from investing time or resources in agricultural 
production and pursue other more predictable non-farming activities so as to substitute farm 
income in the event of an unsuccessful harvest (Ellis, 2000). That is to say that farmers who 
are unable to adequately protect their households from consumption risk choose to avert this 
risk by opting for low risk agricultural production which entails lower returns (Dercon and 
Christiaensen, 2011; Mosley and Verschoor, 2005; Brick and Visser, 2014) 
Two other behavioural and cognitive traits that have been identified in the literature are 
loss aversion and nonlinear probability weighting. Loss aversion is an observed phenomena 
where individuals weight the downside risk associated with an investment more heavily than 
upside risk. Loss averse behaviour can thus result in farmers avoiding the out of pocket costs 
associated with technology uptake even when potential benefits i.e. upside risks are high. 
Nonlinear probability weighting, on the other hand, refers to the observation that individuals 
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have a tendency to overweight small probability events and underweight large probability 
events. Farmers may display “cognitive failure” in that they underweight the possibility or 
severity of disastrous events. For example, stakeholder consultations in India and Mongolia 
show that farmers in recollecting past events tend to underestimate the levels of the negative 
impacts of those past events (Mahul and Stutley, 2010).  This propensity to underweight the 
severity and likelihood of catastrophic events can result in farmers not taking up the technology 
associated with mitigation of the impacts of those events.   
The notion that low income individuals fail to invest in technology as a result of 
behavioural or cognitive inclinations prompted by a set of constraints has been extensively 
considered in literature. One of the most notable theories that have come from this concept is 
the asset based approach to poverty traps. This approach identifies an asset threshold in which 
behaviour toward investment diverges. Individuals below that threshold behave in such a way 
that limits their ability to advance themselves through investment or the accumulation of assets 
(Carter and Barrett, 2006; 2007). This approach is closely linked to one of the key features of 
agricultural growth, namely, equitability. High inequality would point toward the bifurcation 
of behaviour around this threshold being more distinct because of the greater amount of 
restrictions that poor groups face.  Access to credit would be extremely limited for a significant 
portion of the low income population. This would be primarily because the seasonality of 
farming and its vulnerability to natural and unpredictable calamities raise the likelihood of 
default risk of poor farmers and expose the creditors or financial intuitions to covariant price 
and yield risks (Mahul and Stutley; 2010). One factor that reinforces this credit market 
imperfection and is often a characteristic of credit markets in developing countries is absent or 
limited insurance markets. Since agricultural insurance reduces both downside risk and 
variance in outcomes by transferring excess risk to a third party, insured farmers may be more 
inclined to take-up loans to invest in more lucrative but sometime riskier activities (Patt et al., 
2010). A lack or insurance can also discourage low income farmers from taking on credit due 
to the risk of high default costs e.g. repossession of property (Gine and Yang, 2009).  
There are a number of studies that have been undertaken to determine whether the 
availability of insurance inspires its uptake as well as the uptake of technology or credit 
amongst low income farmers. Carter et al. (2008) developed and implemented insurance games 
with cotton farmers in Peru and herders in Kenya. Using real money at stake, they simulated a 
series of years and rainfall index and basis risk through the use of coloured chips.  They 
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observe, in both countries, that majority of the farmers opt to buy some degree of insurance. 
Likewise, Dinku et al. (2009) and Peterson and Mullally (2009) conducted insurance games 
with farmers in Ethiopia as part of a selection of communication instruments to assist in 
explaining index insurance to farmers.11 They find that the majority of the farmers were 
inclined to purchase insurance in the course of the game. Gine and Yang (2009) carried out 
randomized field experiments using small scale farmers in Malawi to determine whether or not 
the availability of insurance against a main source of production risk encourages farmers to 
acquire loans in order to obtain new crop technology. They find loan uptake to be 13 percentage 
points lower amongst farmers offered an insurance-and-loan bundle compared to farmers who 
were only offered a loan thus lending little evidence to suggest that insurance is an effective 
tool in motivating credit uptake. Similar to Gine and Yang (2009, we found that insurance was 
not an effective to tool in reducing the effects of risk aversion associated with technology 
uptake. However, because we considered both absolute uptake and timing of uptake, the time 
factor reveals information that shows that relationship between the insurance component and 
risk aversion is not as simple as when considered in stasis.  
In this chapter, we look at the link between risk aversion, loss aversion and probability 
weighting and the adoption tradition and new farm technology, namely traditional seeds and 
improved seeds (with an uninsured loan and insured loan, respectively). In order to test for 
absolute and path dependent effects, both the levels and timing of adoption are considered. 
Most studies only considered farm technology uptake at an instantaneous point in time but, in 
reality, technology uptake decisions are likely to be made in a series of time frames. For 
example, Liu (2013) carried out an analysis of the role of timing of uptake of bt cotton by 
farmers in China and found that increased risk and loss aversion were correlated with later 
technology adoption. Liu (2013) suggests that as time goes by, farmers have a chance to update 
the information they have regarding the risk of technology which will affect their decisions to 
take up technology. Studies like these, that consider the timing of uptake, can shine further 
light on the factors that determine path dependent or structural immobility as suggested by the 
poverty trap hypothesis.  
We use experimental and survey data obtained from 125 farmers from farming 
communities in the Matzikama Municipality of Western Cape, South Africa. We estimate risk 
                                                             
11 Index insurance is a type of insurance scheme where pays outs are based on a predetermined index, usually a 
weather index (e.g. rainfall level). 
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aversion, loss aversion and probability weighting parameters using the TCN (Tanaka et al. 
(2010)) method. Choices of technology uptake are elicited using a series of insurance games 
with real money at stake. Tanaka et al. (2010) under the assumption of cumulative prospect 
theory conducted experiments with villagers in North and South Vietnam. They presented three 
different multiple price lists with paired lottery choices. The experiment was framed in such a 
way that the switching point in each list could be used to evaluate the three prospect theory 
parameters based on a “parsimonious three parameter cumulative prospect value function” 
(Hurley, 2010).   Tanaka et al. (2010) find that on average individuals were risks averse, loss 
averse and overweighed small probabilities.  
This chapter is broken down into 6 sections. Section 3.1 is the introduction. Section 3.2 
provides back ground information on the sample of study. Section 3.3 describes the risk 
preference estimation method. Section 3.4 shows the experiment design for the insurance 
simulation games. Section 3.5 presents the results for determinants of farm technology uptake. 
Section 6 presents the results for the cox proportional hazard model of timing of uptake. Section 
7 is the conclusion.  
 
3.2 Sample and Background  
The data used in this study was obtained by way of survey and experiments undertaken 
with small-holder farmers in the Matzikama Municipality of the Western Cape, South Africa, 
between July and August of 201012. The area which is mostly dominated by viniculture, 
vegetables, citrus fruits and livestock production is characterised by arid terrains and cool 
temperatures (Matzikama IDP, 2009-2010). Agriculture in Municipality is sustained by the 
Clanwilliam Dam and Olifants River. Our sample consists of 125 farmers from the towns of 
Vanrhynsdorp, Lutzville, Klawer, Clanwilliam and Wupperthal solicited through the 
Matzikama Emerging Farmers Forum.  
 
                                                             
12 Sample questionaire is presented in Appendix 1 
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3.3 Methodology and Experimental Design 
Similar to TCN, the Matzikama farmers were given three sets of multiple price lists 
(MPLs) with pair wise lotteries sheets. The first two lists (i.e. Series 1 and 2) had a series of 14 
decision rows each, with both being gain only lotteries. The third sheet (Series 3) had both gain 
and loss lotteries with 7 decision rows13.  Subjects have a choice between lottery A or lottery 
B in each row. The lotteries were framed to represent farming seasons with lottery A 
representing the outcome if farmers chose to use traditional seeds and lotteries B representing 
the outcome if farmers chose to use improved seeds.  The payoffs are dependent on whether or 
not there is sufficient rainfall for yields to be good. The premise of this framing is that improved 
seeds require more rain relative to traditional seeds. The probabilities in the lotteries 
represented the probabilities of good rainfall for the high payoffs and probabilities of bad rain 
for the low payoffs. The payoffs represent the yields in a farming season. The MPL lotteries in 
TCN were structured so that the switching points of the 3 series produce a permutation of the 
prospect theory parameters risk aversion, non-liner probability weighting and loss aversion. 
Rainfall probabilities were also denoted by 10 numbered balls. For example, for traditional 
seeds in series 1, 3 balls represented good rain fall levels while 7 balls represented poor rainfall 
levels. The rainfall level is determined by one of the subject selecting a ball from the bag.  
The MPL lotteries in TCN were structured so that the switching points of the 3 series 
produce a permutation of the prospect theory parameters risk aversion, non-liner probability 
weighting and loss aversion. Series 1 and 2 estimate the parameters sigma (the measure of risk 
aversion) and alpha (the measure for probability weighting). In Series 1, a set of sigma and 
alpha ( ,  ) combinations that rationalise the switching points are estimated14. Another 
combination of sets that justifies the switching point is found for series 2. For example, if a 
subject switched in row 6 of series 1, the values of sigma and alpha that can rationalise the 
switch is (0.5, 0.4) (0.6, 0.5), (0.7, 0.6), (0.8, 0.7), (0.9, 0.8), (1.0, 0.9). If a subject switched in 
row 6 in series 2, the combination of sigma and alpha that can rationalise the switch is (0.5, 1), 
(0.6, 0.9), (0.7, 0.8), (0.8, 0.7), (0.9, 0.6), (1, 0, and 0.5). The crossing point is thus (0.8, 0.7). 
In TCN, the coefficient of loss aversion (λ) is derived from Series 3: conditional on the value 
                                                             
13 Sample of the MPL’s are presented in Appendix 2. 
14 See section 1.3 for the inequlities implied by the switching points 
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of sigma derived from Series 1 and Series 2, the switching point in Series 3 implies a range of 
values for   . The TCN method produces interval values for the loss aversion parameter. 
 
3.4 Risk Preference Estimation 
The experiments in this study were modelled after the design of Tanaka, Camerer and 
Nguyen (2010) (TCN) who assume cumulative prospect theory. TCN use a series of gain-
only and gain-and-loss pair-wise lotteries with both a risky and safe option (similar to Holt 
and Laury (2002)). They assumed the following utility function: 
 ( ,  ;  ,  ) =   
 ( ) +  ( )  ( ) −  ( )               >   > 0;   <   < 0
 ( ) ( ) +  ( ) ( )                                             < 0 <   
          Equation 3.1 
U(x, p; y, q) denotes the expected value linked to prospects(x, p; y, p),  p and q are the 
probabilities of receiving outcomes x and y, respectively. The power function v(x) = x   for 
gains (x > 0) and v(x) = −λ(−x ) for losses (x < 0) is assumed with σ  being the risk 
aversion parameter (i.e. measure of the concavity of the value function) and λ the parameter 
for loss aversion. The risk aversion parameter (σ) is presumed to be identical in both gains and 
losses; the inequality σ > 1  implies risk seeking preferences and σ <1 implies risk averse 
behaviour. For λ, λ>1(λ<1) implies greater sensitive to losses (gains) compared to gains 
(losses).  
 TCN use the nonlinear probability weighting function of Prelec (1998) where π(p) =
exp[−(− ln p) ] with the function being linear if   α = 1. If α = 1 and λ = 1; in this case the 
model reduces to expected utility.  If α < 1  the function is an inverted S-shape. The inverted 
S-shape indicates that small probabilities are overweighed and large probabilities are 
underweighted. The function is S shaped if  α > 1, indicating that small probabilities are 
underweighted and large probabilities are overweighed. 
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3.5 Timing of Uptake  
3.5.1 The Cox Proportional Hazard  
In order to determine how farmer characteristics and the prospect theory parameters affects the 
timing of uptake, we choose the most widely used model of survival analysis namely, the cox 
proportional hazard model15. The model estimates the relationship between covariates and the 
timing of uptake.  In a proportional hazard model, the unique effect of a unit increase in a 
covariate is multiplicative with respect to the hazard rate, which is defined as the uptake rate 
at time t conditional on no uptake until time t or later.  To denote the model in mathematical 
terms, let us assume T to be a non-negative random variable denoting time to uptake of an 
option which is the survival time. Rather than referring to T’s probability density function f(t) 
– or its cumulative distribution function F(t) = Pr(T<t) survival analysis instead talk about  T’s 
survivor function  S(t) or its hazard function h(t).  The reverse cumulative distribution function 
of T is the survival function: 
                                            S (t) = 1- F (t) = Pr (T >t)                                           Equation 3.2 
The survivor function denotes the probability of survival beyond time t. It is the 
probability that there is no uptake prior to time t. The function is equals to 1 at time 0. The 
function is a non-decreasing function of time.  The density function can be obtained from S (t) 
or F (t): 
                                  ( ) =  
  ( )
  
= 1 −  
 
  
 {1 −  ( )} =−S ′( )                       Equation 3.3 
The hazard function h (t) is used to denote the instantaneous rate of uptake. It is the 
(limiting) probability that the uptake event occurs in a given time interval, condition that the 
subject is still participating at the beginning of the interval, divided by the width of the interval.  
                                         H (t) =    
∆ →  
 
    (  ∆      | )
∆ 
 = 
 ( )
 ( )
                                  Equation 3.4 
The general form of the proportional hazard function is; 
                  ℎ ( ) =  ℎ ( )    (      +       … .      )                              Equation 3.5  
                                                             
15 See Therneau,  and Grambsch, 2000; Lunn  and McNeil, 1995; Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001, Prentice 
et al., 1997 and Liu, 2013. 
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ℎ ( ) is the baseline hazard.  In the cox proportional hazard model, the baseline hazard function 
α( t) = log h0(t)  is unspecified. This model is semi-parametric because, while the baseline 
hazard can take any form, the covariates enter the model linearly. The model is proportional in 
that the ‘hazard’ a subject faces is multiplicatively proportional to the baseline hazard.  ℎ ( ) 
and cancels from the calculation when binary-outcome analyses is undertaken at individual 
failure times.  For example, if we compare subject i to subject m, the model thus states that; 
                                                    
       
 ( |  )
 = 
   (    )
    (    )
                                               Equation 3.6 
3.5.2 Multiple Competing Events  
The cox model described in section 3.5.1 only takes into the occurrence of one event. 
However, in the insurance simulation games used in this analysis, there is a chance of 4 
different events occurring, namely; bankruptcy, uptake of Traditional Seed, High yielding 
seeds with uninsured loan and high yielding seeds with insured loan. Furthermore for each 
individual, only one event occurs at any given time. Therefore, in order to investigate the timing 
factor of the covariates, we need a modified version of the cox model which takes into account 
multiple competing events16.  
In order to take into account multiple competing events, we use the latent survivor time 
approach were we assume that observation ‘i’ is at risk of k different kinds of events. In this 
paper, we have four event types namely, traditional seeds, high yielding seeds with uninsured 
loan, high yielding seeds with insured loan and bankruptcy. There is a different time 
corresponding to each event type and is denoted by           … … . .      with each event also 
having a hazard function  ℎ  ( ) and a survival functions      ( ) .  
Only the shortest duration of time        to each event is observed and is in effect the 
latent failure time. An assumption is made which undertakes that the observed time to event 
(i.e. failure time) exists and is observed if a long enough time went by without failure from any 
other event occurring. A measure of which event is experienced is denoted by     =    if     =
     . The interval for each different event occurring is assumed to not be exactly the same. This 
                                                             
16 See Therneau,  and Grambsch, 2000; Lunn  and McNeil, 1995; Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001, Prentice 
et al., 1997 and Liu, 2013. 
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simply says that more than one different type of event cannot occur at exactly the same time. 
Each uncensored observation thus contributes equation 3.7 to the likelihood. 
                                         ℒ =    (  ,    , β ) ∏   (  |      /  )                            Equation 3.7              
  represents the      event and   in the product term indicates that the product in all 
states, with the exception of  k, is the takeover survivor time The subscript    on    implies that 
for each failure, there are different coefficient sets. Therefore, the heterogeneity across different 
event types in terms of the explanatory variables is capture. The full sample likelihood is 
represented by equation 3.8. Nonetheless because for each unit only a single failure within the 
k possible events is observed, the entire likelihood can be separated using  the amount of units 
failing by each of the k events and written as equation 3.9.  
                                          ℒ =  ∏ f (t , X  , β ) ∏ S (t , X  β )
 
   
 
                      Equation 3.8 
                                          ℒ =  ∏ ∏ f (t , X  , β )S (t , X  , β )β
  
   
 
                     Equation 3.9  
 
3.6 Technology, Loan and Insurance Uptake  
A series of insurance simulation games were conducted to assess whether or not the 
availability of insurance has an impact on the willingness of farmers to take up loan in order to 
invest in technology i.e. high yielding seed.  The farmers in the experiment are provided with 
three choices namely traditional seeds, high yielding seeds which require securing a loan and 
improved seed with an insured loan option17.  The experiment is carried out over 8 rounds with 
each round representing a farming season. The participants are told that their income in each 
round is dependent on the type of seed they choose and amount of rainfall. At the start of the 
games, the participants were informed that the experiments will be carried out in 8 round with 
each representing a farming season. They were also told that they were 3 rainfall levels which 
had equal 0.33 probabilities of occurring. Rainfall levels were represented by 3 balls placed in 
a bag; a blue ball, a yellow ball and a red ball signifying good rainfall levels, low rainfall levels 
and very poor rainfall levels.  The farmers were deprived of an initial endowment in the first 
round. However, the respondents were told they would be given R15 at the end of the rounds 
                                                             
17 A sample of the decision sheet is presented in Appendix 2. 
 60 
 
so as to avoid using their own money to cover losses. The R15 does not count as their 
endowment in the experiments.  A bankruptcy rule is included in the experiment which 
mandates that a participant can only move on to the next round if the cumulative income from 
previous rounds can cover the losses at the end of the current round.   
Once the participant had indicated that they understood the games and after several 
examples, the experiment commenced.  One of the farmers was randomly chosen to a pick a 
random ball from the bag on behalf of the participants. The colour of the selected ball was 
entered into a spread sheet and the participant were able to view the returned earning for a 
particular round, after each round. A participants who did not secure enough earning to move 
on to the next round were disqualified from the games18. The payoff from each option are as 
follows. 
Traditional seeds: These are considered to be seeds that farmers save from their previous 
harvests and thus cost nothing.  The payoff from these seeds after each season is R10 and this 
outcome does not vary. The earning for traditional seeds is R10 regardless of rain fall level. 
The traditional seeds option is a riskless option with expected earnings or certainty value in 
each round being R10. If they favourite the traditional seeds they would get a comparatively 
low payoff of R10 if the rainfall level was good, R10 if the rainfall level was low and R10 if 
the it very low.  We assume that farmers suffer no cost in adopting traditional seeds. 
High yielding seeds: These are assumed to be drought resistant seeds with a farming season 
payoff of R40 when rainfall is good. With low rain, the payoff is R30 which is more than the 
R10 the participants receive if they choose traditional seeds but when rainfall is very low, 
however, the payoff from these seeds is R0.  
 Loan: If the participant chooses to buy high yielding seeds, they have to take out a R10 
loan from the bank to purchase these seeds each season. This loan is to be paid back at 
the end of each season with a R1 interest. So in total the improved seed cost R11. The 
expected earnings for high yielding seeds with a loan are R29, R19 and –R11 for good 
rainfall, low rainfall and very low rainfall respectively. Thus, total expected earnings 
are R12.33 for uptake of high yielding seeds with loan. 
 
                                                             
18 see Appendix 7 for detailed experiment instructions 
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 Insurance: With the exception of round 1, an option of buying rainfall insurance at R2 
at the start of each round is given to the subjects. The subjects had no initial endowment 
in the first round so they could not purchase insurance.  This insurance pays respondent 
R4 when rainfall is low and R8 when rainfall is very low. However, no payoff is given 
when rainfall level is good. The expected earnings for improved seed with loan and 
insurance is R27, R21 and -R5 for good rain, low rain and very low rain, respectively. 
Thus total expected earning is R14.33 for uptake high yielding seeds loan and 
insurance. A breakdown of the payoff in each round is presented in Table 1 below 
Table 1: Payoff in Each Round 
  OPTION 
Earnings if blue ball 
is drawn 
Earnings if yellow ball 
is drawn 
Earnings if red ball is 
drawn 
1 
Traditional seeds: R 10 R 10 R 10 
      
Income for this round: R 10 R 10 R 10 
         
2 
High yielding seeds with 
Uninsured Loan 
R 40 R 30 R 0 
      
Minus cost of loan (R10) 
plus interest (R1) = R11 
R -11 R -11 R -11 
Income for this round: R 29 R 19 R -11 
         
3 
High yielding seeds with 
Insured Loan 
R 40 R 30 R 0 
Minus cost of loan (R10) 
plus interest (R1) = R11 
R -11 R -11 R -11 
Minus cost of insurance R -2 R -2 R -2 
Plus what you get back from 
insurance 
R 0 R 4 R 8 
Income for this round: R 27 R 21 R -5 
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3.6 Results 
3.6.1 Break Down of Uptake in Rounds 
Table 1 presents the percentage uptake in each round with bankruptcy19. From this point 
onwards we consider traditional seeds = TS, high yielding seeds with uninsured loan = 
HYL and high yielding seeds with insured loan = HYLI. In the first panel, uptake is 
aggregated across all subjects per round. In round 1, when the purchase of the insured loan 
option is not possible, 69.60 percent of the farmers take up TS while 30.40 percent of the 
farmers take up HYL. In figure 1 we see a dramatic decline of uptake of TS and a slight decline 
in the uptake of the uninsured loan option, however, we see a steady increase in the uptake of 
the insured loan option over the rounds. In round seven, with insurance available, 33.60 percent 
of the farmers are taking up TS whilst 46.40 percent of the farmers are taking up (HYL and 
HYLI) and 22.40 percent of the farmers have gone bankrupt. This suggests that the availability 
of insurance does served to improve technology uptake and the effect grows stronger with time. 
We now consider through which mechanism access to insurance serves to improve uptake. 
  In Panels 2-5, the percentage uptake is further broken down into 4 categories. The first 
category shows uptake in rounds for individuals that exhibit risk averse behaviour (i.e.  σ < 1) 
and risk seeking behaviour (i.e. σ > 1).   Figure 1 presents a graphical representation of uptake 
in category 1. We do not consider the first round because the purchase of insurance is not 
possible in this round owing to the participant lack or initial endowment. We also do not take 
the final round into consideration in order to discount behaviour associated with terminal 
conditions. Farming, in actual fact, does not have a terminal season thus this round will be less 
representative of real live scenarios.   
If we ignore the initial and final round, we see that the risk averse group start out by 
taking on less TS than the group that exhibits risk seeking behaviour. The risk averse group 
start out by taking on more HYLI than the risk seeking group. However in round 7, the risk 
averse group are taking on more TS and less HYL and HYLI than the risk seeking group. For 
TS, we see a steady decline of uptake from round 3 and, for HYLI, we see a steady rise in 
uptake from round 3. There is also an unsystematic decline in uptake of HYL amongst both 
groups, however, the risk averse group end up with more HYL in round 7 than the risk seeking 
                                                             
19 See breakdown of uptake in rounds without bankrupcy in appendix 8 
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group. The risk averse group are also the only group that goes bankrupt. This demonstrates that 
despite the overall improvement in uptake due to the availability of insurance, as the farmers 
gain more experience in the games, the insurance contract is becoming less and less attractive 
to risk averse group, relative to the risk seeking group. This theory is further reinforced by the 
evidence that the risk averse group end up taking on more(less) of the HYL option in round 
7(3) relative to the risk seeking group.  
The second category shows uptake in rounds for individuals that overweight small 
probabilities (i.e. α < 1) and individual that that under weigh large probabilities (i.e. α > 1). We 
find that the group that overweight’s small probability events start out by taking up more TS 
than the group that underweights small probabilities. They start out by taking on less HYL. 
Even though the probabilities of all-weather events are the same throughout the game, at the 
start of the game, with no accumulated income, the probable relative severity (i.e. potential 
relative losses) associated with TS is less than that associated with HYL.  
The third category shows the uptake per round for individuals that are loss avers (i.e. λ 
> 1) and individuals that are loss seeking (i.e. λ < 1). The results show that the loss averse group 
is more likely to go bankrupt than the loss seeking group.  
The forth category shows uptake per round for individuals that have below average 
relative household income and individuals that have above average in the sample. Relative 
income is measured by the difference between the lowest household income in each community 
and household income divided by the difference between the lowest and largest household 
income in each community. The below average relative income group consistently take up 
more TS than the individuals in the above average relative income group. They also generally 
take up less HYLI compared to their upper income counterparts. This is somewhat consistent 
with the poverty trap hypothesis that suggests behaviour diverges at a certain threshold. Given 
that real life relative income levels affect uptake in the experimental setting, where basis risk 
is absent and all individuals face the same risk and expected outcomes, the outcomes on the 
graph could indicate hopelessness amongst the low income group as explained by Carter and 
Berrett (2006). 
 
 
 64 
 
Table 2: Percentage Uptake and Bankruptcy in Rounds (Sample Size - 125) 
Round    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
    Perc. Perc. Perc. Perc. Perc. Perc. Perc. Perc. 
TS   69.6 44.8 49.6 38.4 42.4 34.4 33.6 31.2 
HYL   30.4 31.2 16 20 12.8 22.4 24 23.2 
HYLI   0 12.8 12.8 19.2 22.4 20.8 20 23.2 
Bankrupt   0 11.2 21.6 22.4 21.6 22.4 22.4 22.4 
Category 1: Level or Risk Aversion. (Sample Size: Risk Averse -   119 , Risk Seeking - 6) 
TS 
Risk Averse 69.75 43.7 48.74 38.66 43.7 34.45 34.45 31.93 
Risk Seeking  66.67 66.67 66.67 33.33 16.67 33.33 16.67 16.67 
HYL 
Risk Averse 30.25 31.09 15.97 20.17 11.76 22.69 24.37 21.85 
Risk Seeking  33.33 33.33 16.67 16.67 33.33 16.67 16.67 50 
HYLI 
Risk Averse 0 13.45 12.61 17.65 21.01 19.33 17.65 22.69 
Risk Seeking  0 0 16.67 50 50 50 66.67 33.33 
Bankrupt 
Risk Averse 0 11.76 22.69 23.53 22.69 23.53 23.53 23.53 
Risk Seeking  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Category 2: Probability Weighting (Sample Size: Overweigh -107, Under weigh -18 ) 
TS 
Over weigh 71.96 45.79 50.47 41.12 43.93 35.51 34.58 29.91 
under weigh 55.56 38.89 44.44 22.22 33.33 27.78 27.78 38.89 
HYL 
Over weigh 28.04 31.78 16.82 19.63 11.21 22.43 22.43 23.36 
Under weigh 44.44 27.78 11.11 22.22 22.22 22.22 33.33 22.22 
HYLI 
Over weigh 0 12.15 11.21 16.82 22.43 19.63 20.56 24.3 
Under weigh 0 16.67 22.22 33.33 22.22 27.78 16.67 16.67 
Bankrupt 
Over weigh 0 10.28 21.5 22.43 21.5 22.43 22.43 22.43 
Under weigh 0 16.67 22.22 22.22 22.22 22.22 22.22 22.22 
Category 3: Level of Loss Aversion(Sample Size: Loss Averse -  50 , Loss Seeking - 75) 
TS 
Loss Averse 69.33 40 45.33 30.67 40 33.33 30.67 26.67 
Loss Seeking 70 52 56 50 46 36 38 38 
HYL 
Loss Averse 30.67 30.67 12 21.33 8 18.67 16 20 
Loss Seeking 30 32 22 18 20 28 36 28 
HYLI 
Loss Averse 0 13.33 12 17.33 21.33 17.33 22.67 22.67 
Loss Seeking 0 12 14 22 24 26 16 24 
Bankrupt 
Loss Averse 0 16 30.67 30.67 29.33 30.67 30.67 30.67 
Loss Seeking 0 4 8 10 10 10 10 10 
Category 4: Average Relative Income Position(Sample Size: Below Average - 75, Above Average - 50) 
TS 
Below Avg. 74.65 50.7 50.7 42.25 47.89 38.03 38.03 36.62 
Above Avg. 62.96 37.04 48.15 33.33 35.19 29.63 27.78 24.07 
HYL 
Below Avg. 25.35 36.62 14.08 16.9 14.08 22.54 23.94 29.58 
Above Avg. 37.04 24.07 18.52 24.07 11.11 22.22 24.07 14.81 
HYLI 
Below Avg. 0 9.86 12.68 18.31 15.49 16.9 15.49 11.27 
Above Avg. 0 16.67 12.96 20.37 31.48 25.93 25.93 38.89 
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Bankrupt 
Below Avg. 0 2.82 22.54 22.54 21.13 22.54 22.54 22.54 
Above Avg. 0 22.22 20.37 22.22 22.22 22.22 22.22 22.22 
 
 
3.6.1.1 Graphical Representation of Uptake in Rounds  
 
Figure 1: Percentage Uptake in Round by Uptake and Bankruptcy  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Uptake in Round by Risk Aversion Levels 
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Figure 3: Uptake in Rounds by Probability Weighting Levels 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Uptake in Rounds by Loss Aversion Levels 
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Figure 5: Uptake in Rounds by Relative Income Level 
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monthly household relative income and ‘0’ if it is above average. Once again we discount the 
initial and final rounds. The coefficients on the multinomial logit regressions are the expected 
changes in the probability of taking up an option due to a unit change in the explanatory 
variable.  The results are presented in Table 3.  
Our findings indicate that females are more likely to go bankrupt (p-value = 0.017; 
0.008; 0.003) as well as people who have experienced a shock in previous (p-value = 0.037; 
0.119; 0.055).  Interestingly, those who experienced a shock in earlier rounds were more likely 
to switch from other options to HYL relative to TS (p-value =0.003; 0.003; 0.002   ). It is not 
evident whether they are moving from TS to HYL or from HYLI to HYL. A move from HYLI 
to HYL will suggest that those who experience a shock did not find the insurance cover in the 
experiment to be sufficient.   
Risk aversion is found to be related to lower uptake of both HYL and HYLI (p-value 
=0.018; 0.014; 0.018, p-value = 0.067; 0.045; 0.064). In contrast, our results shows that the 
effect of loss aversion on uptake goes in the opposite direction, specifically we see that loss 
aversion is related to greater likelihood of uptake of HYL(p-value = 0.001;  0.006; 0.001). 
Leading out previous discussions about poverty traps, we see here that an increase in 
cumulative income (earned over rounds of the experiment) increases the likelihood of taking 
up HYL, as well as, HYLI (p-value =0.093; 0.918; 0.143, p-value =0.000; 0.000; 0.000). This 
finding falls in line with the asset based approach to poverty traps which suggest that people 
with more accumulated assets are more likely to invest in and benefit from technology uptake.  
Finally, with regards to the role of income on uptake, we find no evidence to suggest 
that real life household income affects uptake, it, however, decreases the likelihood of 
bankruptcy (p-value = 0.046). Our results also show that individuals with below-average 
relative income in real life are more likely to go bankrupt (p-value = 0.025). Equally those with 
below-average relative income (in real life) are less likely to take-up both HYL and HYLI (p-
value = 0.040, p-value =0.085). This result confirms the poverty trap hypothesis which says 
behaviour towards investment bifurcates at a certain threshold (in this case: average relative 
income) (Carter and Barrett, 2006). The behaviour of the poorest in the sample indicates less 
inclination to invest in new technology. They thus prolong their destitute conditions for the 
reason that they cannot realise productivity gains associated with improved investment. 
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3.6.3 Determinants of Timing of Uptake 
   The results of the cox proportional hazard model regressions on the experimental 
uptake options are presented in the Table 4 below.  The coefficients are the hazard rates.  A 
negative coefficient implies a decrease in the hazard rate which means an increase in the time 
to uptake (later uptake). A positive coefficient implies an increase in the hazard rate, which 
indicates a decrease in the time to uptake (earlier uptake).  
Our result indicate that the greater the level of risk aversion, the later uptake of TS and 
the earlier the uptake of HYLI (HYLI) (p-value = 0.007; 0.024; 0.073, p-value = 0.001; 0.001; 
0.032). Despite controlling for other factors, this result supports the evidence in table 2 where 
the risk averse farmers take up more TS in round 7 and take up more for the HYLI option in 
round 2 relative to the risk seeking group.  In view of that, more risk averse individuals are 
first-movers to take up insurance as a way to mitigate risk. On the other hand in section 3.2.6 
we find that more risk averse individuals are overall less likely to take up HYLI.  They also 
take up less of the insurance option relative to TS. Hence more risk averse individuals, as they 
gain more experience in the games, may find the cover provided by the insurance to be 
insufficient.   
We find that individuals who overweight small probability events take up HYL option 
later (p-value = 0.015; 0.006; 0.067). We also find that more loss averse individuals take up 
TS earlier (p-value = 0.055; 0.079). Greater loss aversion therefore only raises worries about 
downside risk in earlier stages. This is evident given that, in the section 3.6.2, the likelihood of 
aggregate uptake of HYL compared to TS is higher for loss averse individuals.  
Our findings also show that older individuals take up HYLI earlier, females take up TS 
earlier and increases in education levels are linked to earlier uptake of HYLI; this may suggest 
that more educated individuals have a greater aptitude for understanding the insurance 
contract(p-value =0.000; 0.012, 0.025, p-value =0.094, p-value =0.001; 0.007; 0.035 ). Farm 
experience is found to be related to earlier uptake of TS and later uptake of HYL (p-value 
=0.098, p-value = 0.007; 0.008; 0.036). We also find that household income is related to earlier 
uptake of HYL option, but the effect is marginal (p-value =0.019).  
Greater cumulative experimental income is found to be related to later uptake of HYL 
and HYLI (p-value =0.027; 0.027; 0.056, p-value = 0.001; 0.000; 0.012). This is not surprising 
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considering that higher cumulative income indicates a greater capacity to bear the default cost 
of an uninsured loan and, all things equal, will be higher at later stages of the game. However 
at the earlier stages of the experiment when cumulative incomes are lows, TS is the safer option 
because of the low relative costs associated with its uptake. We also see that individuals with 
below average relative income take up the HYL option earlier (p-value =0.054) and, given the 
lower likelihood of uptake of this option in section 3.6.3, this points toward divestment by 
lower income groups as time goes by which is consistent with the ‘de-cumulation’ of assets 
stated in the poverty trap theory.  
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3.7 Conclusion (Chapter 3) 
In developing countries, small scale farming has been explored and promoted as a tool 
to sustain growing food demand and reduce poverty. However, low income small-scale farmers 
in developing countries often face constraints such as limited access to credit and insurance 
markets which prevent them from investing in new agricultural technology that could boost 
productivity. According to the poverty trap hypothesis groups that are below a certain asset 
threshold face severe constraints such that their behaviour limits their ability to use traditional 
mechanisms (e.g. technology) to further themselves. These groups are therefore stuck in a 
poverty trap.  People below this threshold would be unable or reluctant to access credit that 
enables them to take up technology. Furthermore, lenders will be disinclined to provide loans 
to this group due to high default risks and potential borrower in this group will be reluctant to 
take up loans due to preferences associated with the downside risk of borrowing. Consequently, 
many countries have explored the role of agricultural insurance as a tool to motivate farmers 
to purchase new technology using devices such as credit. The premise is that agricultural 
insurance serves to lessen risk by transferring surplus risk to third parties and would thus 
motivate farmers to acquire more rewarding but sometime riskier investments. 
To test the hypothesis that access to insurance stimulates technology uptake, we 
conducted an analysis to determine the effects of insurance on farmers risk preferences (i.e. 
risk aversion, loss aversion and probability weighting) that are linked to farm technology 
uptake. In a series of insurance simulation games, we assume that in order to purchase new 
farm technology (i.e. high yielding seeds) farmers must take up a loan. An option to take the 
loan bundled with an insurance package is given to the farmers. The options the farmers have 
are traditional seeds, high yielding seeds (with uninsured loan) and high yielding seeds (insured 
loan). Farmers can also go bankrupt if they face a loss greater than their cumulative income in 
the games. Owing to the hypothesis that behaviour diverges at a certain income threshold, we 
consider the farmers relative income position in our study.  We test for both absolute and path 
dependent effects by examining both the levels and timing of uptake.  
Our results show that even with the insurance package, risk aversion is found to be 
related to lower uptake of improved seed. Uptake with the insured loan option is even lower 
than with the uninsured loan. Even though risk aversion is related to lower overall uptake of 
high yielding seeds, we consistently find that greater risk aversion results in later uptake of TS 
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and earlier uptake of HYLI. It is, therefore, possible that as the farmers gain more experience 
in the games, more risk averse individuals find the cover provided by the insurance as 
insufficient. This may explain the later shift to TS. 
  Our results also show that loss aversion is related to greater uptake of technology for 
both the insured and uninsured loan option. We consistently find that more loss averse 
individuals take up TS earlier. This points towards loss averse individuals being more 
concerned with downside risk at earlier stages as opposed to in the overall game.  As a result, 
they avoid downside risk by opting for the safer traditional option at the start of the game. We 
also find that loss averse individual take up HYL early but not as early as TS.  The overall 
likelihood of uptake of this option compared to TS is higher for loss averse individuals. This 
again confirms that downside risk is only a concern at the very early in the game. With more 
experience in the game more loss averse individuals shift to the improved seed with loan 
option. This may indicate that experience reduces the fear of down side risk. We, however, find 
no evidence to suggest the insurance option is attractive to loss averse individuals. 
 Individual below average relative income threshold are found to be more likely to and 
both HYL and insured loan option, with the likelihood of uptake being lower for the insured 
loan option. They are also found to be more likely to go bankrupt.  The effect on real life 
relative income is surprising, given that the farmers do not have their own money at stake in 
the experiments. This would suggest that the effect is purely an outcome of behaviour 
associated with the lower relative income group. This result further validates the poverty trap 
hypothesis. We also see that individuals with below average relative income take up TS later 
suggesting that as time goes by more individual with below average relative income shift from 
other options to TS. That is to say that there is not only stasis amongst the low income group 
but a reversion by those already investing which further supports the poverty trap hypothesis.  
In this chapter, we found little evidence to suggest that insurance serves as an effective 
tool to counteract the risk preferences and behaviour that are linked to low technology uptake 
amongst low income farmers. It may be the case that the cost of the insurance premium in the 
experiment is considered too high by the farmers. One solution would be for policy makers to 
offer premium subsidies under programs that target smallholder poor farmers.  
It is important to point out that our study only accounts for the behaviour of potential 
borrowers.  In the real world, agricultural insurance may still be essential because it can 
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encourage lending owing to the positive effect is has on the creditworthiness of farmers and 
other agricultural sector participants.  Insofar as this type of insurance improves the general 
financial stability of agribusiness, unforeseen benefits though credit accessibility can occur at 
other points of the agricultural market chain. (Mahul and Stutley, 2010) 
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Conclusion 
The theory on poverty traps suggests that poor smallholder farmers in developing 
countries stay in conditions of persistent poverty because certain behavioural anomalies that 
are associated with the constraints they face result in a disinclination to take up new investment. 
In addition, the theory proposes that providing poor farmers with access to insurance and credit 
will counterweight the dampening effects of these behavioural anomalies on investment in farm 
technology.  In this study, we investigate the validity of this hypothesis using both real life and 
experimental data.  In Chapter 1, using a sample of small-scale conventional farmers, we 
determine whether or not farm technology uptake is limited by certain behavioural anomalies, 
i.e. risk preferences, and low relative income levels.  We find that, for the farmers, being below 
the average relative income threshold has a negative impact on the uptake of all but one of the 
uptake options we explored, this result therefore supports the poverty trap hypothesis. In 
Chapter 2, we use a sample of organic farmers to conduct an analysis similar to chapter 1 and 
we again find that having below the average relative household income has the most consistent 
effect, it is linked to lower uptake of almost all the technology types we explored. In chapter 1 
and 2, risk preferences do not seem to have a consistent or across the board effect on technology 
uptake.  In Chapter 3, using experimentally obtained data from the conventional farmers, we 
determine whether or not risk preferences are mechanisms via which insurance motivates 
uptake. We test for both absolute and path dependent effects by examining both the levels and 
timing of uptake.  Risk aversion is found be responsible for lower technology uptake in the 
experimental study.  
In Chapter 1 and 2, we find no strong relationship between the risk preference 
parameters and behaviour.  Given that in real life farming scenarios, the accurate probability 
of outcomes are hardly know, one could infer that measures of ambiguity preferences may have 
a stronger impacts than measures of risk preferences. It is thus important to evaluate both risk 
and ambiguity preferences and consider them both when examining the impact of uncertainty 
related preferences on technology uptake. Another reason for the weak relationship between 
risk preference and behavior in chapter 1 and 2 is possibly that the risk level of choices are 
unknown in the analysis, we only infer. Furthermore, the options we explored may have 
substitutes or compliments with unknown risk and cost factors.   
In all 3 analyses, one consistent finding is that having below average relative income 
position is linked to lower uptake. In Chapter 3, our results show that access to insurance 
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improves uptake in the overall sample. However, contrary to the poverty trap hypothesis, we 
found little evidence to suggest that the insurance contract in our study serves as an effective 
tool to counteract the risk preferences that are linked to low technology uptake. This finding is 
evident when considering both absolute uptake and the timing of uptake. The finding that 
farmers with below average relative income are less likely to take up technology in the 
experiment is unexpected. This is because all farmers in the study face the same object risk, 
given that they do not have their real life incomes in at stake.  In addition, we find that the 
availability of insurance does not improve the likelihood of uptake amongst the low relative 
income farmers. This may suggest that constraints faced by lower income groups result in some 
form of behavioural anomaly or psychological response that is not accounted for by risk 
preference. One example could be a feeling of hopelessness or pessimisms as a result of 
persistent poverty which gives rise to underinvestment in technology.  
One interesting finding in Chapter 2, where we explored organic farmers, is that despite 
institution support the dampening effect of low relative income still persists. This signals the 
need for greater studies into the types of institutional support that are relevant to organic 
farming which is relatively more risky and uncertain than traditional farming. Based on our 
experimental results, we suggest that greater provision of insurance should be explored as one 
of the devices in both organic and convention agricultural modernisation policy, but careful 
consideration should be given to the type of insurance contract and whether or not the insurance 
contract provides sufficient cover. Our results also infer that equity issue should be examined 
more comprehensively, this includes not only the monetary issues but also the psychological 
components such as those linked to social exclusion.   
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1  
 
Questionnaire 
 
Experiment number: _____________ 
 
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1. Age: _________________________ 
 
 
2. Gender:        [put a tick in the relevant box] 
 
 Male   
 
 Female 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 
3. How well can you read in your home language? 
 
 I cannot read 
 
 Not well 
 
 Fair 
 
 Very well 
 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
 
4. How well can you write in your home language? 
 
 I cannot write 
 
 Not well 
 
 Fair 
 
 Very well 
 
 Prefer not to answer 
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5. What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
 
 
 No schooling 
 
 Sub A 
 
 Sub B 
 
 Standard 1 
 
 Standard 2 
 
 Standard 3 
 
 Standard 4 
 
 Standard 5 
 
 Standard 6 
 
 Standard 7 
 
 Standard 8 
 
 Standard 9 
 
 Diploma/certificate with less than a Standard 10/Matric certificate 
 
 Standard 10/ Matric 
 
 Diploma or certificate (with a Standard 10/Matric certidicate) 
 
 Degree 
 
 Postgraduate degree or diploma 
 
 
INCOME 
 
6. How many people (including you) live in your household? ______________________ (here, 
you should include all those people who sleep in the same household as you on a regular basis) 
 
 
7. How many people aged less than 18 live in your household? ______________________ (here, 
you should include all those people who sleep in the same household as you on a regular basis) 
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8. Are you the main breadwinner in your household? 
 
 Yes    
 
 No   
 
 
9. Thinking about your own household’s financial situation, would you describe yourself as: 
 
 Poor 
 
 Lower income 
 
 Middle income 
 
 Upper income 
 
 Rich 
 
 
10. What is your household’s monthly income? R_______________________ 
 
 
11. Do you have a sufficient amount of food in your household?  
 
 We always have enough food in our household 
 
 Most of the time we enough food in our household 
 
 We often do not have enough food in our household 
 
 We never have enough food in our household 
 
 
EMPLOYMENT 
 
12. Besides your own farming activities, do you have a job? 
 
 Yes  
 
 No 
 
 
13. If yes, what job do you do?  __________________________________________ 
 
 
14. What is your monthly income from this job?  R___________________________ 
 
 
15. Is the job full-time or part-time? 
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 Full-time 
 
 Part-time  
 
 I do not have a job 
 
 
16. If you are not working, do you have any other form of income? 
 
 Pension: if so, how much do you receive each month? R_______________ 
 
 Child Care Grant: if so, how much do you receive each month? R_____________ 
 
 Disability Grant: if so, how much do you receive each month? R_____________ 
 
 Remittances: if so, how much do you receive each month? R_____________ 
 
 
17. In addition to your farming activities and any job that you have already told us about, do 
you have a part-time job or do you do any activity to earn money for yourself? 
 
 Yes: if so, tell us what you do: ____________________________________________ 
 
 No 
 
 
18. How much do you earn each month from this job or activity? R__________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
FARMING ACTIVITIES 
 
 
19. How many years have you been involved in farming?  ____________________ 
 
 
20. What kind of crops do you grow? ______________________________________ 
 
 
21. How much do you earn during a farming season from farming activities? R_________ 
 
 
22. On what type of land do you grow crops or rear animals on? 
 
 Land which you or a household member owns    
 
 Land which you or a household member has access to as an employee on a commercial farm 
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 A land reform project on state land 
 
 An equity share scheme on a commercial farm 
 
 Communal land 
 
 Land in/near an informal or urban settlement in which the household lives 
 
 
23. How many hectares is the land that you farm? _______________________________ 
 
 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
24. Have you noticed any of the following changes? 
 
Changes in the frequency and timing of rainfall?  Yes      No 
 
Changes in the rainfall level?  Yes   No 
 
Changes in the rainfall intensity?  Yes  No 
 
An increase in temperature?  Yes   No 
 
An increase in the number of pests?  Yes   No 
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25. Which of the changes have affected your crop yield? 
 
 these changes have not affected my crop yield    
 
 Changes in the frequency and timing of rainfall  
 
 Changes in the level of rainfall  
 
 Changes in the rainfall intensity  
 
 An increase in the temperature  
 
 An increase in the number of pests 
 
 
26. How has your crop yield been affected? 
 
 My yield has increased 
 
 My yield has decreased 
 
 My yield has been affected 
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NEW FARMING PRACTICES 
 
 
27. Please indicate whether you have adopted any of the farming strategies listed below: 
 
[Please tick all the options that apply to you] 
 
 I have not adopted any new farming practices 
 
 Growing more drought resistant crops  when: Year: __________ Month: __________ 
 
 Using improved seeds          when: Year: __________ Month: __________ 
 
 Intercropping                                          when: Year: __________ Month: __________ 
 
 Mulching                                                when: Year: __________ Month: __________ 
 
 Applying fertilizer                                  when: Year: __________ Month: __________ 
 
 Applying organic manure                      when: Year: __________ Month: __________ 
 
 Changing planting dates                        when: Year: __________ Month: __________ 
 
 Planting wind breaks                             when: Year: __________ Month: __________ 
 
 Using irrigation                                      when: Year: __________ Month: __________ 
 
 Other: ______________________        when: Year: __________ Month: __________ 
 
 
28. If you have adopted new farming practices, how have they affected your yield? 
 
 My yield has increased 
 
 My yield has decreased 
 
 My yield has stayed the same 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29. If you have not adopted new farming practices, why have you not? 
 
 I do not know what measures to take (or what methods to use) 
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 I do not have the money to adopt these measures 
 
 The risk of crop failure is too great 
 
 Other: _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
CREDIT AND INSURANCE 
 
30. Are you a member of a savings group? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 I used to 
 
 
31. If YES, have you contributed this year? 
 
 Yes; if so: how much did you contribute this year? R____________________ 
 
 I have not yet contributed 
 
 Will not contribute this year 
 
 I prefer not to answer 
 
32. If you want to invest in farming equipment or other farming inputs, where do you obtain the 
money for this? 
 
 From my savings 
 
 I borrow money from my savings group 
 
 I request a loan from the bank 
 
 I request a loan from a financial institution 
 
 I borrow money from friends and/or relatives 
 
 Other; please specify: ____________________________________________________ 
33. Have you ever applied for a loan from a bank or other formal institution for farming 
activities? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
34. Did you take any bank loans for farming this year? 
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 Yes; if so: how much was requested: R____________________ 
           ; if so: was the loan granted?  Yes    No 
 
 No 
 
 
35.  If you have never attempted to borrow money, why have you not? 
 
 There are no formal lending institutions 
 
 I did not need credit 
 
 I dislike any borrowing 
 
 The loans are too expensive 
 
 I would have like to apply for a loan but did not apply because I felt that the loan would not be 
granted 
 
 Other; if so, please specify: ___________________________________________________ 
 
 
36. Have you heard of insurance? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
37. Would you consider purchasing insurance? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
 
 
SOCIAL 
 
38. Which of the following statements describes you the best?  
 
 I often take risks 
 
 I sometimes take risks 
 
 I never take risks 
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Appendix 2 
Series 1 
Once again please assume that it is planting season. You must decide whether you would like to plant 
traditional seeds or improved seeds. 
This game consists of 14 rows. For each row, you must decide between planting traditional seeds or 
improved seeds. 
Let’s do an example [turn to the poster]. Look at row 1: 
Let’s start with traditional seeds. The level of rainfall will be enough for a high yield if you draw ball 
number 1, 2 or 3 out of this bag. If you draw ball number 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10 out of the bag, there is 
drought. If you planted traditional seeds and there is enough rain for a high yield, your harvest will be 
worth R20. If you planted traditional seeds and there is a drought, your harvest will be worth R5. 
With improved seeds: there will be enough rain for a good harvest if you draw ball number 1 out of 
this bag. If you draw ball number 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10 out of the bag, there is a drought. If you 
had planted improved seeds and there is enough rain for a good harvest, your harvest will be worth 
R34. If you had planted improved seeds and there is a drought, your harvest will be worth R2.50.  
Now let’s move to row 2: 
Let’s start with traditional seeds. There will be enough rain for a good harvest if you draw ball 
number 1, 2 or 3 out of this bag. If you draw ball number 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10 out of the bag, there is a 
drought. If you planted traditional seeds and there is enough rain for a good harvest, your harvest will 
be worth R20. If you planted traditional seeds and there is a drought, your harvest will be worth R5. 
With improved seeds: there will be enough rain for a good harvest if you draw ball number 1 out of 
this bag. If you draw ball number 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10 out of the bag, there is a drought. If you 
had planted improved seeds and there is enough rain for a good harvest, your harvest will be worth 
R34. If you had planted improved seeds and there is a drought, your harvest will be worth R2.50.  
Notice that the balls showing whether there is enough rain for a good harvest or whether there is 
drought stay the same throughout the game. The value of the harvest for planting traditional seeds also 
stays the same throughout the game. The only thing that changes is the value of the harvest for 
planting improved seeds when there is enough rain for a good harvest.  
In the first row, if you plant improved seeds and there is enough rain for a good harvest, your harvest 
is worth R34. In the very last row, if you plant improved seeds and there is enough rain for a good 
harvest, you harvest is worth R850.  
Remember, because the payoffs are so high for this game, if this game is chosen to be played for real 
money, two of you will randomly be chosen to play the game for money. We don’t know who those 2 
of you will be, so it is important to play this game as if you are playing for real money.  
Just like before, we won’t play all the rows for money. Once you have made your decisions, one of 
you will draw a ball from this bag which has 14 balls inside it. This will tell us which row you are 
playing for money. If ball number 1 is drawn from the bag, you will play row 1 for money. If ball 
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number 2 is drawn from the bag, you will play row 2 for money. If ball number 14 is drawn from the 
bag, you will play row 14 for money.  
Does anyone have any questions before we start? 
Let’s start. Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the top left hand 
side of the sheet where it says experiment number [gesture to where they must put their number]. 
For each row in the sheet in front of you, indicate whether you would like to plant traditional seeds or 
improved seeds.  
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  Traditional Seeds Improved Seeds 
1  
R20 if  R34 if  
 R5 if  R2.5 if  
    
2  
R20 if  R37.5 if  
 R5 if  R2.5 if  
    
3  
R20 if  R41.5 if  
 R5 if  R2.5 if  
    
4  
R20 if  R46.5 if  
 R5 if  R2.5 if  
    
5  
R20 if  R53 if  
 R5 if  R2.5 if  
    
6  
R20 if  R62.5 if  
 R5 if  R2.5 if  
    
7  
R20 if  R75 if  
 R5 if  R2.5 if  
    
8  
R20 if  R92.5 if  
 R5 if  R2.5 if  
    
9  
R20 if  R110 if  
 R5 if  R2.5 if  
    
10  
R20 if  R150 if  
 R5 if  R2.5 if  
    
11  
R20 if  R200 if  
 R5 if  R2.5 if  
    
12  
R20 if  R300 if  
 R5 if  R2.5 if  
    
13  
R20 if  R500 if  
 R5 if  R2.5 if  
    
14  
R20 if  R850 if  
 R5 if  R2.5 if  
 
Answer: 
 
I choose Traditional Seeds for rows 1 - 
 
I choose Improved Seeds for rows                   - 14 
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Series 2 
 
This game works exactly the same as the previous game. Once again please assume that it is planting 
season. You must decide whether you would like to plant traditional seeds or improved seeds. This 
game also consists of 14 rows. For each row, you must decide between planting traditional seeds or 
improved seeds. 
 
Let’s do an example [turn to the poster]. Look at row 1: 
Let’s start with traditional seeds. There will be enough rain for a good yield if you draw ball number 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9 out of this bag. If you draw ball number 10 out of the bag, there is a drought. 
If you planted traditional seeds and there is enough rain for a good yield, your harvest will be worth 
R20. If you planted traditional seeds and there is a drought, your harvest will be worth R15. 
With improved seeds: there will be enough rain for a good yield if you draw ball number 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, or 7 out of this bag. If you draw ball number 8, 9 or 10 out of the bag, there will be a drought. If 
you had planted improved seeds and there is enough rain for a good yield, your harvest will be worth 
R27. If you had planted improved seeds and there is a drought, your harvest will be worth R2.50.  
Now let’s move to row 2: 
Let’s start with traditional seeds. There will be enough rain for a good yield if you draw ball number 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9 out of this bag. If you draw ball number 10 out of the bag, there is a drought. 
If you planted traditional seeds and there is enough rain for a good yield, your harvest will be worth 
R20. If you planted traditional seeds and there is a drought, your harvest will be worth R15. 
With improved seeds: there will be enough rain for a good yield if you draw ball number 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, or 7 out of this bag. If you draw ball number 8, 9 or 10 out of the bag, there is a drought. If you had 
planted improved seeds and there is enough rain for a good yield, your harvest will be worth R28. If 
you had planted improved seeds and there is a drought, your harvest will be worth R2.50.  
Notice that the balls showing whether there is enough rain for a good harvest or whether there is 
drought stay the same throughout the game. The value of the harvest for planting traditional seeds also 
stays the same throughout the game. The only thing that changes is the value of the harvest for 
planting improved seeds when there is enough rain for a good yield.  
In the first row, if you plant improved seeds and there is enough rain for a high yield, your harvest is 
worth R27. In the very last row, if you plant improved seeds and there is enough rain for a high yield, 
you harvest is worth R65.  
Just like before, we won’t play all the rows for money. Once you have made your decisions, one of 
you will draw a ball from this bag which has 14 balls inside it. This will tell us which row you are 
playing for money. If ball number 1 is drawn from the bag, you will play row 1 for money. If ball 
number 2 is drawn from the bag, you will play row 2 for money. If ball number 14 is drawn from the 
bag, you will play row 14 for money.  
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Does anyone have any questions before we start? 
Let’s start. Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the top left hand 
side of the sheet where it says experiment number [gesture to where they must put their number]. 
For each row in the sheet in front of you, indicate whether you would like to plant traditional seeds or 
improved seeds.  
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  Traditional Seeds Improved Seeds 
1  
R20 if  R27 if  
 R15 if  R2.5 if  
    
2  
R20 if  R28 if  
 R15 if  R2.5 if  
    
3  
R20 if  R29 if  
 R15 if  R2.5 if  
    
4  
R20 if  R30 if  
 R15 if  R2.5 if  
    
5  
R20 if  R31 if  
 R15 if  R2.5 if  
    
6  
R20 if  R32.5 if  
 R15 if  R2.5 if  
    
7  
R20 if  R34 if  
 R15 if  R2.5 if  
    
8  
R20 if  R36 if  
 R15 if  R2.5 if  
    
9  
R20 if  R38.5 if  
 R15 if  R2.5 if  
    
10  
R20 if  R41.5 if  
 R15 if  R2.5 if  
    
11  
R20 if  R45 if  
 R15 if  R2.5 if  
    
12  
R20 if  R50 if  
 R15 if  R2.5 if  
    
13  
R20 if  R55 if  
 R15 if  R2.5 if  
    
14  
R20 if  R65 if  
 R15 if  R2.5 if  
 
Answer: 
 
I choose Traditional Seeds for rows 1 - 
 
I choose Improved Seeds for rows                     - 14 
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Series 3 
This game works exactly the same as the previous game.  
 
Once again please assume that it is planting season. You must decide whether you would like to plant 
traditional seeds or improved seeds. 
 
This game consists of 7 rows. For each row, you must decide between planting traditional seeds or 
improved seeds. 
The difference in this game is that, now, you can lose money. Any money you lose will be taken from 
your earnings for this session. 
Let’s do an example [turn to the poster]. Look at row 1: 
Let’s start with traditional seeds. There is enough rain for a good yield if you draw ball number 1, 2, 
3, 4 or 5 out of this bag. If you draw ball number 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10 out of the bag, there is a drought. If 
you planted traditional seeds and there is enough rain for a good yield, your harvest will be worth 
R12.50. If you planted traditional seeds and there is a drought, you will lose R2. 
With improved seeds: there is enough rain for a good yield if you draw ball number 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 out 
of this bag. If you draw ball number 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10 out of the bag, there is a drought. If you planted 
improved seeds and there is enough rain for a good yield, your harvest will be worth R15. If you 
planted improved seeds and there is a drought, you will lose R10.50. 
Now let’s move to row 2: 
Let’s start with traditional seeds. There is enough rain for a good yield if you draw ball number 1, 2, 
3, 4 or 5 out of this bag. If you draw ball number 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10 out of the bag, there is a drought. If 
you planted traditional seeds and there is enough rain for a good yield, your harvest will be worth 
R12.50. If you planted traditional seeds and there is a drought, you will lose R2. 
With improved seeds: There is enough rain for a good yield if you draw ball number 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 out 
of this bag. If you draw ball number 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10 out of the bag, there is a drought. If you planted 
improved seeds and there is enough rain for a good yield, your harvest will be worth R15. If you 
planted improved seeds and there is a drought, you will lose R10.50. 
Just like before, we won’t play all the rows for money. Once you have made your decisions, one of 
you will draw a ball from this bag which has 7 balls inside it. This will tell us which row you are 
playing for money. If ball number 1 is drawn from the bag, you will play row 1 for money. If ball 
number 2 is drawn from the bag, you will play row 2 for money. If ball number 7 is drawn from the 
bag, you will play row 7 for money.  
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Does anyone have any questions before we start? 
Let’s start. Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the top left hand 
side of the sheet where it says experiment number [gesture to where they must put their number]. 
For each row in the sheet in front of you, indicate whether you would like to plant traditional seeds or 
improved seeds.  
 
 Rainfall Traditional Seeds Improved Seeds 
1 
 R12.5 if  R15  if  
 -R2     if  -R10 if  
    
2 
 R2  if  R15  if  
 -R2 if  -R10 if  
    
3 
 R0.5 if  R15  if  
 -R2   if  -R10 if  
    
4 
 R0.5 if  R15  if  
 -R2   if  -R8   if  
    
5 
 R0.5 if  R15  if  
 -R4   if  -R8   if  
    
6 
 R0.5 if  R15  if  
 -R4   if  -R7   if  
    
7  
R0.5 if  R15  if  
 -R4   if  -R5.5   if  
 
Answer: 
I choose Traditional Seeds for rows 1 - 
I choose Improved Seeds for rows                    - 7 
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Appendix 4 
Questionnaire 
 
Experiment number: _____________ 
 
Please note that you are free to leave out any questions that you prefer not to 
answer. 
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1. Age: __________________________________ 
 
2. Date of Birth: __________________________ 
 
3. Gender:  
 [Tick one box only] 
 Male   
 Female 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 
4. How well can you read in your home language: 
[Tick one box only] 
 I cannot read 
 Not well 
 Fair 
 Very well 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
 
5. What is the highest level of education that you have completed: 
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[Tick one box only] 
 No schooling 
 Sub A 
 Sub B 
 Standard 1 
 Standard 2 
 Standard 3 
 Standard 4 
 Standard 5 
 Standard 6 
 Standard 7 
 Standard 8 
 Standard 9 
 Diploma/certificate with less than a Standard 10 (Matric certificate) 
 Standard 10 (Matric certificate) 
 Diploma or certificate (with a Standard 10/Matric certificate) 
 Degree 
 Postgraduate degree or diploma 
 Other: please explain: _________________________________________________ 
 
YOUR HOUSEHOLD 
 
Here, you should include all those people who sleep in the same household as you on a regular basis and 
share from the food in the home with other household members) 
 
6. How many people (including you) live in the household? _______________________ 
 
7. How many people aged less than 18 live in the household? _____________________ 
 
8. How many people living in your household have regular employment? ___________ 
INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT 
 
9. What is your monthly income from your farming activities? 
 R_________________ 
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 Prefer not to answer 
 
10. In ADDITION to your farming activities, are you being paid a wage or salary by an 
employer for regular full-time or part-time work? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
11. If you answered yes, what is your monthly salary or wage from this job? 
 R________________ 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
12. In ADDITION to your farming activities, are you self-employed? This means that your 
work for yourself on a full-time or part-time basis and not for an employer. 
 Yes 
 No 
 
13. If you answered yes, what is your monthly salary from your self-employment activities? 
 R____________ 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
14. In ADDITION to your farming activities AND any job that you have ALREADY told us 
about, do you do any other job or activity to earn money for yourself? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
15. If you answered yes, what is your monthly salary from this job or activity? 
 R____________ 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
16. What is your monthly income FROM ALL YOUR JOBS? 
 R____________ 
 Prefer not to answer 
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17. Please show which bracket your monthly income falls into: 
 R0-R250 
 R251-R500 
 R501-R1000 
 R1001-R2000 
 R2001-R3000 
 R3001-R4000 
 R4001-R5000 
 R5001-R6000 
 R6001-R7000 
 R7001-R8000 
 R8001-R9000 
 R9001-R10000 
 More than R10000 per month 
 
18. Are you the main breadwinner in your household? 
 Yes    
 No   
 
 
 
 
 
 
GOVERNMENT GRANTS 
 
19. Do you or any of your household members receive any money from the Government? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
20. If yes, what do you receive this money for, and how much do you receive? 
 Pension: if so, how much do you receive each month? R_______________ 
 Child Care Grant: if so, how much do you receive each month? R_____________ 
 Disability Grant: if so, how much do you receive each month? R_____________ 
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 Prefer not to answer 
 
 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
 
21. Please show which bracket your monthly household income falls into: 
 R0-R250 
 R251-R500 
 R501-R1000 
 R1001-R2000 
 R2001-R3000 
 R3001-R4000 
 R4001-R5000 
 R5001-R6000 
 R6001-R7000 
 R7001-R8000 
 R8001-R9000 
 R9001-R10000 
 More than R10000 per month 
 
 
22. Thinking about your own household’s financial situation, would you describe yourself as: 
 Poor 
 Lower income 
 Middle income 
 Upper income 
 Rich 
 
HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE 
 
23. Please show which expenditure bracket your average monthly household expenditure falls 
into: 
 R0-R250 
 R251-R500 
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 R501-R1000 
 R1001-R2000 
 R2001-R3000 
 R4001-R5000 
 R5001-R6000 
 R6001-R7000 
 R7001-R8000 
 R8001-R9000 
 R9001-R10000 
 More than R10000 per month 
 
FARMING ACTIVITIES 
 
24. Which farming area are you from?  
 Khayelitsha 
 Nyanga 
 Other: please specify: _______________________________ 
25. How many years have you been involved in farming? ______________________ 
 
26. With regard to the plot of land that you farm on, do you farm on a community plot of land 
or an individual plot of land? 
 Community/group plot 
 Individual plot 
 
27. If you do farm on a community plot, how many people (including yourself) farm on the 
same plot of land? ___________________ 
 
28. If you farm on a community plot, do you have an individual plot of land on the community 
plot that you are responsible for, or do you all share the plot? 
 Yes, I have an individual plot of land in the community plot 
 No, we all share the plot 
 
29. If you farm on a community plot, are you all equally involved in the decision-making?  
 Yes, we all make decisions together 
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 No, one person makes decisions on behalf of the rest of us 
 Other: _____________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
30. How many metres long and wide is the land that you farm: 
 
 
 
 
 
Metres long: _____________________ 
Metres wide: ____________________ 
31. What kind of crops do you grow?  
 Sweet potatoes 
 Lettuce 
 Spinach 
 Cauliflower 
 Broccoli 
 Carrots 
 Beetroot  
 Turnips 
 Cabbage 
 Fennel 
 Tomatoes 
 Other: _________________________________________________________ 
 
NEW FARMING PRACTICES 
 
32. Please indicate whether you have started using any NEW farming practices: 
[Please tick all the options that apply to you] 
 
 I have not started using any new farming practices 
 
                   Long 
 
Wide 
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 Mulching (covering the soil to keep in moisture) 
Year: __________ 
Month: __________ 
Why did you start doing this? _____________________________________________ 
 
 Using seeds that grow better in dry weather conditions 
Year: __________  
Month: __________ 
Why did you start doing this? _____________________________________________ 
 Intercropping (growing two crops on the same land) 
Year: __________ 
 Month: __________ 
Why did you start doing this? _____________________________________________ 
 
 Using fertilizer  
Year: __________ 
 Month: __________ 
Why did you start doing this? _____________________________________________ 
 
 Using organic manure 
Year: __________ 
Month: __________ 
Why did you start doing this? _____________________________________________ 
 
 Changing planting dates 
Year: __________ 
Month: __________ 
Why did you start doing this?  _____________________________________________ 
 
 Planting wind breaks  
Year: __________ 
Month: __________ 
Why did you start doing this? _____________________________________________ 
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 Using irrigation (water from a tap) 
Year: __________ 
Month: __________ 
Why did you start doing this?  _____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 Other: ______________________________________________________________        
Year: __________ 
 Month: __________ 
Why did you start doing this? _____________________________________________ 
 
CREDIT 
 
33. Have you ever applied for a loan from a bank or any other financial institution? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
34. If yes, you have applied for a loan, did the bank give you the loan? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
35. If you have never applied for a loan from a bank or financial institution, why have you not? 
[Tick as many options as you like] 
 I do not like to borrow money from anyone 
 I prefer to borrow money from family and friends 
 I did not know how to apply for a loan 
 A loan is too expensive and difficult to pay back 
 I did not think I would be given a loan so I never applied for one 
 I have not needed to take out a loan 
 Other: if so, please specify: ______________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
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36. Do you personally have any of the loans mentioned below 
[Please tick all the options that apply to you] 
 Home loan 
 Personal loan  
 Study loan 
 Vehicle finance 
 Credit card 
 Store card (for example: Edgars, Clicks, Foschini) 
 Loan from a friend or family member 
 
37. If you want to buy new farming equipment or new farming inputs (like seeds), where do you 
get the money for this? 
 From my personal savings 
 I borrow money from my savings group 
 I get a loan from the bank 
 I borrow money from friends and/or relatives 
 Other; please specify: __________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
INSURANCE 
 
38. Have you heard about buying insurance products to protect yourself against risk or 
negative events (for example a fire)? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
39. Have you ever experienced a negative event and wished that you had been insured? 
 Yes 
 No 
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40. Do you think buying insurance is a useful way to protect yourself against risk and negative 
events? 
 Insurance is very useful 
 Insurance is sometimes useful 
 Insurance is not very useful 
 I don’t know  
 
41. Have you ever had an insurance policy? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
42. If yes, you have had an insurance policy, what type of insurance policy was/is it? 
 Crop insurance 
 Life insurance 
 Funeral policy 
 Medical insurance 
 Disability insurance 
 Homeowners insurance 
 Vehicle insurance 
 Other; if so, please specify: ___________________________________________ 
 
43. Do you still have this/these insurance policy/policies?  
Please select the policy/policies you still have: 
 Crop insurance 
 Life insurance 
 Funeral policy 
 Medical insurance 
 Disability insurance 
 Homeowners insurance 
 Vehicle insurance 
 Other; if so, please specify: ___________________________________________ 
44. If you have never bought insurance: what is the reason for this? 
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 I have never thought of buying insurance 
 I don’t really understand how buying insurance will benefit me 
 I have thought about buying insurance, but don’t know how to buy it 
 I have thought about buying insurance, but find that buying insurance is too complicated and 
difficult 
 I have thought about buying insurance, but it is too expensive 
 I do not want to buy insurance 
 
ATTITUDES TO RISK 
 
45. What type of person are you? 
[Tick one box only] 
 A person who often takes risks 
 A person who sometimes takes risks 
 A person who never takes risks 
 
46. Do you every buy lottery tickets (lotto and powerball for example)? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
47. If yes, how often do you buy lottery tickets? 
 Every day 
 Once a week 
 Twice a month 
 Once a month 
 Every two months 
 Four times a year 
 Twice a year 
 Once a year 
 
48. How much do you usually spend on lotto tickets when you buy them? 
 R______________________ 
 Prefer not to answer 
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49. Do you ever play Fafi (iChina)? 
 Yes 
 No  
 
50. If yes, how often do you play Fafi? 
 Every day 
 Once a week 
 Twice a month 
 Once a month 
 Every two months 
 Four times a year 
 Twice a year 
 Once a year 
 
51. How much do you usually spend when you play Fafi? 
 R______________________ 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
52. Do you ever play card/dice games for money? 
 Yes 
 No  
 
53. If yes, how often do you play card/dice games for money? 
 Every day 
 Once a week 
 Twice a month 
 Once a month 
 Every two months 
 Four times a year 
 Twice a year 
 Once a year 
 
54. How much do you usually spend when you play card/dice games for money? 
 R______________________ 
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 Prefer not to answer 
 
 
55. Do you ever bet on animals (for example horse racing, dog racing etc)? 
 Yes 
 No  
 
56. If yes, how often do you bet on animals? 
 Every day 
 Once a week 
 Twice a month 
 Once a month 
 Every two months 
 Four times a year 
 Twice a year 
 Once a year 
 
57. How much do you usually spend when you bet on animals? 
 R______________________ 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
58. Do you ever go to the casino (for example play the slot machines)? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
59. If yes, how often do you go to the casino? 
 Every day 
 Once a week 
 Twice a month 
 Once a month 
 Every two months 
 Four times a year 
 Twice a year 
 Once a year 
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60. How much do you usually spend at the casino when you go? 
 R______________________ 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
 
Appendix 5 
Framing: Table a represents the gains prospect while table 1b represents the losses prospect, 
with probability levels of the first, second and third gamble being 30 percent, 50 percent and 70 percent, 
respectively. 
Table a: 30 percent, 50 percent and 70 percent gains gambles (in Rand) 
Gamble Option 1 Option 2 
 Min. Max. Prob. Prize EV 
1 R3 R26 30 percent R50 R15 
2 R13 R36 50 percent R50 R25 
3 R23 R46 70 percent R50 R35 
      
 
Table b: 30 percent, 50 percent and 70 percent losses gambles (in Rand) 
Gamble Option 1 Option 2 
 Min. Max. Prob. Prize EV 
1 -R3 -R26 30 percent -R50 -R15 
2 -R13 -R36 50 percent -R50 -R25 
3 -R23 -R46 70 percent -R50 -R35 
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Sample Decision Sheets 
 
30% Probability of Gains 
 Option 1   Option 2  
      
[1] R3 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[2] R4 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[3] R5 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[4] R6 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[5] R7 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[6] R8 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[7] R9 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[8] R10 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[9] R11 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[10] R12 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[11] R13 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[12] R14 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[13] R15 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[14] R16 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[15] R17 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[16] R18 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[17] R19 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[18] R20 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[19] R21 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[20] R22 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
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[21] R23 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[22] R24 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[23] R25 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[24] R26 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
 
 
 
50% Probability of Gains 
 
 Option 1   Option 2  
      
[1] R13 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[2] R14 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[3] R15 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[4] R16 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[5] R17 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[6] R18 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[7] R19 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[8] R20 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[9] R21 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[10] R22 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[11] R23 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[12] R24 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[13] R25 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[14] R26 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[15] R27 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[16] R28 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[17] R29 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
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[18] R30 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[19] R31 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[20] R32 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[21] R33 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[22] R34 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[23] R35 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[24] R36 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
 
 
70% probability of gains 
 Option 1   Option 2  
      
[1] R23 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[2] R24 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[3] R25 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[4] R26 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[5] R27 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[6] R28 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[7] R29 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[8] R30 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[9] R31 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[10] R32 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[11] R33 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[12] R34 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[13] R35 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[14] R36 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[15] R37 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[16] R38 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
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[17] R39 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[18] R40 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[19] R41 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[20] R42 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[21] R43 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[22] R44 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[23] R45 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
      
[24] R46 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     R0 /     R50  
 
 
 
30% Probability of Losses 
 Option 1   Option 2  
      
[1] LOSE R3 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[2] LOSE R4 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[3] LOSE R5 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[4] LOSE R6 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[5] LOSE R7 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[6] LOSE R8 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[7] LOSE R9 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[8] LOSE R10 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[9] LOSE R11 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[10] LOSE R12 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[11] LOSE R13 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[12] LOSE R14 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[13] LOSE R15 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
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[14] LOSE R16 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[15] LOSE R17 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[16] LOSE R18 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[17] LOSE R19 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[18] LOSE R20 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[19] LOSE R21 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[20] LOSE R22 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[21] LOSE R23 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[22] LOSE R24 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[23] LOSE R25 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[24] LOSE R26 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
 
 
 
 
50% probability of Losses 
 Option 1   Option 2  
      
[1] LOSE R13 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[2] LOSE R14 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[3] LOSE R15 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[4] LOSE R16 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[5] LOSE R17 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[6] LOSE R18 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[7] LOSE R19 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[8] LOSE R20 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[9] LOSE R21 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
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[10] LOSE R22 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[11] LOSE R23 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[12] LOSE R24 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[13] LOSE R25 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[14] LOSE R26 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[15] LOSE R27 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[16] LOSE R28 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[17] LOSE R29 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[18] LOSE R30 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[19] LOSE R31 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[20] LOSE R32 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[21] LOSE R33 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[22] LOSE R34 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[23] LOSE R35 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[24] LOSE R36 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
 
 
70% Probability of Losses 
 Option 1   Option 2  
      
[1] LOSE R23 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[2] LOSE R24 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[3] LOSE R25 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[4] LOSE R26 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[5] LOSE R27 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[6] LOSE R28 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[7] LOSE R29 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[8] LOSE R30 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
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[9] LOSE R31 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[10] LOSE R32 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[11] LOSE R33 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[12] LOSE R34 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[13] LOSE R35 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[14] LOSE R36 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[15] LOSE R37 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[16] LOSE R38 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[17] LOSE R39 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[18] LOSE R40 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[19] LOSE R41 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[20] LOSE R42 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[21] LOSE R43 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[22] LOSE R44 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[23] LOSE R45 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
      
[24] LOSE R46 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:       R0 /    -R50  
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Appendix 7 
Insurance Games Experiment Instructions 
We will be completing 1 activity. This activity is played over eight rounds.  
Let’s begin. We will do eight rounds of this activity and each round will represent a farming season. 
In this exercise we are going to imagine that you are at the start of a farming season. You have to make a 
decision about the type of seeds you are going to use for this season. Your income will depend on what 
type of seed you plant and the amount of rainfall the district receives.  
RAINFALL 
To see how much rainfall there is for the round we will draw a ball from this bag. If we draw a blue ball 
that means the rainfall is good. If a yellow ball is drawn that means the rainfall is low and if a red ball is 
drawn the rainfall is very low. There are three blue balls in the bag, three yellow balls and three red balls. 
[SHOW THEM ALL THE BALLS THAT WILL GO INTO THE BAG] 
Alright let me ask you a question. If I pull out a ball from the bag, is it more likely that it will be a blue 
ball, a yellow ball or a red ball? 
[WAIT FOR RESPONSE] 
[IF THEY GET IT RIGHT] That’s right. There is an equal chance of drawing out a blue ball, a yellow 
ball or a red ball. Why? Because there are three balls of each colour. 
[IF THEY GET IT WRONG] Actually, there is an equal chance of drawing out either a blue ball, a 
yellow ball or a red ball because there are exactly the same number of balls of each colour.  
Let’s do an example. Would anyone like to pull a ball out of the bag? 
 [PICK A VOLUNTEER] 
You sir?  You are going to draw a ball out of the bag. [HAVE HIM OR HER PULL OUT A BALL 
FROM THE BAG]. A [COLOUR OF BALL] ball. So is the rain collected by the rainfall meter good, low 
or very low? [WAIT FOR RESPONSE; HELP THEM IF THEY HAVE TROUBLE]. Yes, it will be 
[RAINFALL TYPE].  
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TRADITIONAL SEEDS: 
You have always used a certain type of seed every year which we shall call traditional seeds. Compared 
with other types of seeds these traditional seeds give you a lower yield. However they always give you 
the same yield whether the rains are good, low or very low. In other words, you always know what to 
expect. If you decide to plant these seeds, come harvest time, you will receive R10 for your yield for this 
farming season if the rains are good, low or very low. 
If you would like to stick with the traditional seeds there is no cost in using these seeds. We will assume 
that you have been storing some of these seeds after every farming season over the years. So you can go 
ahead and start planting.  
NEW IMPROVED SEEDS: 
On the other hand, you have heard that new types of seeds have been introduced in Matzikama and that 
only a few farmers have started using them. You have not yet used these seeds but you have heard great 
things about them and you are wondering if you should try them. The few farmers who have started using 
these new seeds have told you that the seeds are drought resistant and can increase the yield on your piece 
of land substantially. 
If you choose to use these new seeds and if the rains are good you earn R40 in one farming season. If the 
rains are low you earn R30 which is more than the R10 you get from the traditional seeds. But, you are 
told that there is a disadvantage to using the new seeds. If the rains are very low you will not get any yield 
from your land. You have a decision to make. Do you want to plant traditional seeds which always give 
you the same yield when rains are good and even when they are bad? Or do you want to try the new seeds 
which give you a higher yield when the rains are good or low, but which give you a zero yield when the 
rains are very low? 
LOAN FOR BUYING NEW IMPROVED SEEDS: 
However, if you decide to grow the new seeds you will have to borrow money from the bank to buy these 
seeds. They are expensive because they give you higher yields than the traditional seeds in most cases. 
You are required to take out a R10 loan in order to buy these new seeds. At the end of the season you are 
required to pay back the R10 plus an additional R1, which is interest on the loan. So, in total, if you 
would like to purchase the new seeds, the loan will cost you R11.  
Are there any questions? 
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[PAUSE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS] 
LOAN AND INSURANCE 
In addition to the loan, you can also buy insurance that will protect you from losing income if rainfall is 
low or very low. We will call this insurance “rainfall insurance.”  
We will first explain about the insurance. Insurance is a way to protect against losses. You pay a little bit 
before the season begins to protect against losses. In the case of rainfall insurance if the rains are low or 
very low in a particular farming season the insurance company will give you some money to make up for 
the losses due to not having enough rain. But if the rains are good you do not receive any money from 
insurance. Why? Because your crops received enough rainfall.  Losses that you experience on your farm 
as a result of other things such as pests or crop disease are not covered by this type of insurance. Also, 
whether the rainfall is low or not you must always pay for the insurance before the round begins if you 
want this protection against losses. 
The money that is paid out by the insurance to you is meant to protect against losses suffered due to the 
rains being below what you would normally expect. How does the insurance company decide if the rains 
are low or not? A container which measures rainfall is placed in a central location in each town and 
village in Matzikama. This container acts as a rainfall meter. It records how much rain you receive in the 
area during the rainy season. If the rains are good (a blue ball is drawn from the bag), the container will 
have a lot of water in it when the insurance company goes to check it.  
If you decide to buy insurance, you will receive money from the insurance company only if [STRESS 
THIS POINT] the rain collected by the rainfall meter is low or very low; that is, if a yellow or red ball are 
pulled out from the bag in each round. 
What the insurance company does not know is the actual crop yield you get on your farm. To do this they 
would have to go from farm to farm, asking everyone with insurance whether they had a large, average or 
small harvest. This would cost too much money and make the insurance very expensive. Therefore we 
will only use the amount of rainfall recorded at the rainfall meter to determine the amount you will 
receive from insurance. 
So how does this really work? This figure [POINT TO FIGURE IN FRONT OF THE ROOM] explains 
how rainfall amounts are tied to insurance payments. Remember that if you want insurance payouts you 
must first pay for insurance at the beginning of the round.  Insurance costs R2. Remember this is just an 
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exercise, so the cost of insurance is very low here. It would be much more expensive if you were actually 
buying for your farm. Your payments from the insurance company would also be much larger. 
Table 2: Insurance 
 If a blue ball is 
drawn from the 
bag 
GOOD 
RAINFALL 
If a yellow ball is 
drawn from the 
bag 
LOW 
RAINFALL 
If a red ball is 
drawn from the 
bag 
VERY LOW 
RAINFALL 
Cost of insurance: R2 R2 R2 
If you have bought 
insurance you 
receive: 
R0 R4 R8 
 
As I said earlier you only receive money from the insurance if rain collected by the rainfall meter is low 
or very low, or when a yellow or red ball is pulled from the bag.  
As you can see from the chart you receive a big payment from insurance of R8 when a red ball is pulled 
out meaning rain is very low in the rainfall meter. You receive the smaller payment of R4 when a yellow 
ball is drawn out meaning rain is low in the rainfall meter. You will not receive anything from the 
insurance if a blue ball is drawn because this means that the rains were good. Remember that if you are 
interested in buying insurance, you always pay R2 for insurance at the beginning of the round. 
BANKRUPTCY RULE: 
At the end of every round we will give you information about what your earnings for that round was and 
also what your TOTAL EARNINGS for Activity 2 are so far. If at the end of any round in this activity, if 
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you have made a loss you can still continue to the next round if your TOTAL INCOME for Activity 2 so 
far (which includes your income from previous rounds) can cover your losses. If not, you will be 
disqualified from the ACITIVTY 2, which means you will not be able to continue to the next round. You 
will however each receive R15 at the end of this activity to cover you for such losses so that you will 
not lose any of your own money or money that you earned in ACTIVITY 1.  
EXAMPLE OF ACTIVITY 2:  
So now that I have explained everything to you, lets do an example. 
In this activity you have to decide if you want to use traditional seeds or new seeds.  If you want to use 
the traditional seeds you do not have to worry about borrowing money or buying insurance. 
If however you decide to use the new seeds you will have to [STRESS THIS POINT] borrow R10 from 
the bank to pay for the seeds. Remember that you will have to pay this back with R1 interest at the end of 
the round. In total you will have to pay back R11. 
If you want to use the new seeds you could in addition to taking out a loan, also buy insurance for R2 
which will pay out  R4 if the rainfall is low and R8 if the rain is very low.  
 
The figure on this board (or wall) shows you exactly how this all works.Let’s go over the figures in this 
table: [SHOW THEM THE TABLES] 
INCOME IF YOU USE TRADITIONAL SEED: 
If you decide to use traditional seeds you will receive R10 in the first round if the rains are good. If the 
rains are low, you will also receive R10 and when the rains are very low you will still receive R10. Are 
there any questions? 
[PAUSE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS] 
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OPTION Earnings if blue 
ball is drawn 
Earnings if yellow 
ball is drawn 
Earnings if red ball 
is drawn 
1. 
 
If you choose to use 
traditional seeds you 
receive (for your 
harvest): 
R10 R10 
 
R10 
Income for this 
round: 
R10 R10 R10 
Total Income for 
all previous 
rounds: 
….. ….. ….. 
     
2.
  
If you choose to take 
out a loan to buy 
improved seeds, you 
receive (for your 
harvest): 
R40 R30 R0 
 
Minus cost of loan 
(R10) plus interest 
(R1) = R11 
-R11 -R11 -R11 
Income for this 
round: 
R29 R19 -R11 
Total Income for 
all previous 
rounds: 
….. ….. ….. 
     
3. If you choose to take 
out a loan and to 
also buy insurance, 
you receive (for your 
harvest): 
R40 R30 R0 
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Minus cost of loan 
(R10) plus interest 
(R1) = R11 
-R11  -R11 -R11 
Minus cost of 
insurance 
-R2 -R2 -R2 
Plus what you get 
back from insurance 
+R0 +R4 +R8 
Income for this 
round: 
R27 R21 -R5 
Total income for all 
previous rounds: 
….. ….. ….. 
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INCOME IF YOU TAKE OUT A LOAN TO BUY NEW SEEDS 
If you decide to use new seeds you have to borrow R10 from the bank so that you can buy the new seeds. 
If the rains are good, that is, if a blue ball is drawn from the bag, you will receive R40. However, from 
that R40 you will have to pay back the bank the R10 you borrowed at the start of the round plus an 
additional interest of R1. So in total you will owe the bank R11. You will be left with R29 after 
paying back the loan. This is your TOTAL INCOME for Activity 2 so far. 
If the rains are low, that is, if a yellow ball is pulled out, you will receive R30 at the end of the round. 
Again you will have to pay back the R11 to the bank, leaving you with R19. This is your TOTAL 
INCOME for Activity 2 so far. 
 If the rains are very low, that is, if a red ball is drawn out, you will not receive any income for your 
harvest. This is because your seeds failed to germinate. However, you still need to pay back the money 
you borrowed from the bank. So although you did not make any money, you still owe the bank the R10 
you borrowed at the beginning of the round plus the R1 interest. This leaves you with a LOSS (or 
negative income) of –R11 for this round.  
This is where the bankruptcy rule comes in. If you make a loss we will have to check if you have 
enough TOTAL INCOME (from previous rounds) to cover your losses and to continue. If you 
don’t, you will not be able to continue to the next round, and you will be disqualified from the 
activity. [EXPLAIN TO THEM THAT IN THE FIRST ROUND THEY WILL NOT HAVE 
FUNDS FROM PREVIOUS ROUNDS TO COVER SUCH LOSSES] 
As we explained before, even though you have made a loss – you will receive R15 at the end of 
Activity 2 to cover any such losses. 
Are there any questions? 
[PAUSE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS] 
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LOAN AND INSURANCE 
If you decide to use new seeds and in addition to the loan you also want to buy insurance this will cost 
you an additional R2. In the first round none of you will be able to afford insurance, since you have 
not received any income for your harvest yet.  Remember what we said about the insurance. You have 
to pay for it before the round begins if you are interested in insurance and this will cost you R2 at the 
beginning of the round. [SHOW THEM THE DISTRIBUTION CHART AGAIN] 
So, if we draw out a blue ball this means that the rains are good and you receive R40 and the 
insurance pays out nothing. But remember that we will subtract the R11 you owe for taking out 
a loan, and that you already paid R2 for insurance coverage, so you income for this round is 
R27.  
If the rains are low, that is, if we draw out a yellow ball, you will receive R30 and the insurance will 
pay out another R4.. Again you will owe the bank R11, and remember that you paid R2 for 
insurance, so you income for this round will be R21.  [SHOW THEM THE DISTRIBUTION 
CHART AGAIN]  
If we draw out a red ball, we assume that your crops failed and so you do not earn any money from 
your farm. Your seeds were unsuccessful and you did not make any money, but the insurance pays out 
R8.  Once again you owe the bank R11, and remember that you paid R2 for insurance coverage, 
so you make a loss (negative income) of –R5 for this round. [SHOW THEM THE 
DISTRIBUTION CHART AGAIN].  
Once again this is where the bankruptcy rule comes in. If you make a loss we will have to check 
if you have enough TOTAL INCOME (from previous rounds) to cover your losses and to 
continue. If you don’t, you will not be able to continue to the next round, and you will be 
disqualified from the activity. [EXPLAIN TO THEM THAT IN THE FIRST ROUND THEY 
WILL NOT HAVE FUNDS FROM PREVIOUS ROUNDS TO COVER SUCH LOSSES] 
As we explained before, even though you have made a loss – you will receive R15 at the end of 
Activity 2 to cover any such losses. 
We have given you a lot of information today and I am sure there are some questions. If 
anything is unclear please feel free to ask before we begin the activity. Remember you are 
playing for real money so make sure you understand all this before you start playing. 
[PAUSE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS] 
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The assistants will hand out new pieces of paper which you will use to indicate the option you 
want i.e. 1, 2 or 3 [ASSITANTS: HAND OUT SHEETS. POINT OUT DIFFERENT PARTS OF 
THE WORKSHEET AS EMCEE EXPLAINS THEM]. At the end of each round, you will be asked 
to indicate your choice on this sheet of paper as you did in the first activity. After you’ve circled 
the option you want our assistants will come round to you and collect your answer sheets. We 
will work out how much each person gets. Before we move on to the next round we will give 
each person receipt feedback sheet which tells you how much money you earned in this round 
and what you TOTAL INCOME is for Activity 2 so far.  
Before we begin, let’s do an example.  
[EMCEE: PICK ANOTHER VOLUNTEER]. You sir. Please choose one of the three options. Now 
pick someone else to draw a ball from the bag. [PARTICIPANT DRAWS BALL]. You drew a 
[COLOUR OF BALL] ball from the bag. This means the rainfall for this round is [RAINFALL 
TYPE]. How much would he have earned if we were playing an actual round?  
We need to explain here that in this activity only one person will draw out a ball for the entire group 
in each round. Why do you think this is the case? The reason is that if there is high rainfall in your 
town, you are all likely to receive the same amount or very similar amounts of rainfall on your farm. 
If there is low rainfall in the rainfall meter it is likely that you all received low rains on your farms, so 
we only need one person to draw out a ball for us. 
Does anyone have any questions? Ok, we are ready to start this exercise. [ASSISTANTS SHOW 
YOUR GROUP MEMBERS HOW TO MAKE THEIR CHOICES]. After they have finished making 
their choices find a volunteer to draw out a ball for the group. Record earnings for the round. 
[REPEAT AS IN ROUND 1 FOR ROUNDS 2-8] 
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Appendix 8 
Percentage Uptake in Rounds(without bankrupt individuals) 
Round    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
TS   69.60% 50.45% 63.27% 49.48% 54.08% 44.33% 43.30% 40.21% 
HYL   30.40% 35.14% 20.41% 25.77% 16.33% 28.87% 30.93% 29.90% 
HYLI   0.00% 14.41% 16.33% 24.74% 28.57% 26.80% 25.77% 29.90% 
Level or Risk Aversion 
TS 
Risk Averse 69.75% 49.52% 63.04% 50.55% 56.52% 45.05% 45.05% 41.76% 
Risk 
Seeking  66.67% 66.67% 66.67% 33.33% 16.67% 33.33% 16.67% 16.67% 
HYL 
Risk Averse 30.25% 35.24% 20.65% 26.37% 15.22% 29.67% 31.87% 28.57% 
Risk 
Seeking  33.33% 33.33% 16.67% 16.67% 33.33% 16.67% 16.67% 50.00% 
HYLI 
Risk Averse 0.00% 15.24% 16.30% 23.08% 27.17% 25.27% 23.08% 29.67% 
Risk 
Seeking  0.00% 0.00% 16.67% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 66.67% 33.33% 
Probability Weighting 
TS 
Overweigh 71.96% 51.04% 64.29% 53.01% 55.95% 45.78% 44.58% 38.55% 
Underweigh 55.56% 46.67% 57.14% 28.57% 42.86% 35.71% 35.71% 50.00% 
HYL 
Overweigh 28.04% 35.42% 21.43% 25.30% 14.29% 28.92% 28.92% 30.12% 
Underweigh 44.44% 33.33% 14.29% 28.57% 28.57% 28.57% 42.86% 28.57% 
HYLI 
Overweigh 0.00% 13.54% 14.29% 21.69% 28.57% 25.30% 26.51% 31.33% 
Underweigh 0.00% 20.00% 28.57% 42.86% 28.57% 35.71% 21.43% 21.43% 
Level of Loss Aversion 
TS 
Loss Averse 69.33% 47.62% 65.38% 44.23% 56.60% 48.08% 44.23% 38.46% 
Loss 
Seeking 70.00% 54.17% 60.87% 55.56% 51.11% 40.00% 42.22% 42.22% 
HYL 
Loss Averse 30.67% 36.51% 17.31% 30.77% 11.32% 26.92% 23.08% 28.85% 
Loss 
Seeking 30.00% 33.33% 23.91% 20.00% 22.22% 31.11% 40.00% 31.11% 
HYLI 
Loss Averse 0.00% 15.87% 17.31% 25.00% 30.19% 25.00% 32.69% 32.69% 
Loss 
Seeking 0.00% 12.50% 15.22% 24.44% 26.67% 28.89% 17.78% 26.67% 
Relative Income 
TS 
Below Avg. 74.65% 52.17% 65.45% 54.55% 60.71% 49.09% 49.09% 47.27% 
Above Avg. 62.96% 47.62% 60.47% 42.86% 45.24% 38.10% 35.71% 30.95% 
HYL 
Below Avg. 25.35% 37.68% 18.18% 21.82% 17.86% 29.09% 30.91% 38.18% 
Above Avg. 37.04% 30.95% 23.26% 30.95% 14.29% 28.57% 30.95% 19.05% 
HYLI 
Below Avg. 0.00% 10.14% 16.36% 23.64% 19.64% 21.82% 20.00% 14.55% 
Above Avg. 0.00% 21.43% 16.28% 26.19% 40.48% 33.33% 33.33% 50.00% 
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Graphical Representation of uptake in rounds 
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